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Surrogate Lawyering: Legal Guidance, sans
Lawyers
PAUL R. TREMBLAY*
ABSTRACT
Innovative thinkers within the access-to-justice (ATJ) movement have been
experimenting with creative ideas for delivering meaningful legal guidance in
an efficient way to clients struggling with civil legal needs. These efforts
respond to the long-standing crisis in the delivery of legal services to disadvan-
taged persons, and the overwhelming need for legal advice in areas such as
debt collection, housing, family, and immigration. One such imaginative pro-
posal is what this Article calls "surrogate lawyering." This innovation envi-
sions public interest law firms using some scarce lawyer time to train and
advise community-based organization (CBO) staff members to respond, in real
time and in context, to the legal problems their constituents encounter. Crafted
well and complemented by technological aids being developed by ATJ entrepre-
neurs, surrogate lawyering could substantially improve the lives of the clients
in need.
This Article assesses the ethical implications of the surrogate lawyering
venture. It concludes that the lawyers who advise the CBO staffers would not in-
advertently trigger an attorney-client relationship with the constituents/clients
who benefit from the staffer's guidance. Nor would those lawyers have agency-
driven commitments to the constituent/clients. The public interest law firm likely
would, though, have attorney-client duties to the CBO, and would need to
account for that reality in its operations.
This Article proceeds to address the potential concern involving the unau-
thorized practice of law (UPL) and the lawyers' assistance with that activity. It
concludes that the surrogacy model most likely triggers UPL concerns in light
of existing substantive law and policies. But this Article then critiques those
UPL concerns, demonstrating that neither the constituent/clients nor the legal
profession would be likely to suffer any appreciable harm by permitting surro-
gate lawyering ventures to operate. This Article closes with suggestions for
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some adjustments to the usual UPL constraints that would permit surrogate
lawyering strategies while minimizing any risks associated with that means of
delivering legal advice.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article represents a thought experiment at the intersection of access-to-
justice (ATJ) and legal ethics. It examines the legal ethics implications of an ATJ
innovation, not yet implemented in practice but considered with some frequency
in recent years, that we might call "surrogate lawyering."' Surrogate lawyering
represents a mission-driven strategy of a public interest legal services organiza-
tion to provide guidance to its intended client community through social service
agency staff members. A component of legal aid provision for years, 2 this model
serves as the basis for several innovative nonprofit initiatives being considered or
created across the country.3 Its driving insight is that the scarce legal resources
represented by available poverty lawyers may be multiplied through the use of
existing social service providers who encounter individuals and families in
need on a regular basis. The surrogate model promises useful legal information
delivered at street level by savvy and experienced nonlawyers, and in an inter-
disciplinary way. It contrasts with the traditional model of lawyers providing
"bespoke" legal services to clients,4 and serves as an alternative and supple-
ment to technology-based innovations within the ATJ communities.'
The goal of this Article is to identify the legal ethics challenges presented by a
model of delivering legal help to those who need it by using intermediaries, and
to generate ideas for resolving or ameliorating those legal ethics hurdles. Because
1. I use the term "surrogate lawyering" with some hesitance, as the model described here provides legal
guidance to consumers through lay intermediaries, with lawyers decidedly at the periphery. Because the term
"lawyering" has come to include the provision of legal advice, I have opted to use the phrase here.
2. Community-based legal aid organizations have long been known to offer training to tenant advocates, for
example, or to social workers, to assist them to provide better services to their clients. See, e.g., Derek A.
Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical
Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2581, 2594 (1999) (describing examples); Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal
Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241 (1999); Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery ofLegal
Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 216 (1990) [hereinafter Rhode, Delivery].
3. See, e.g., THIRD MASS. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT ON ACTIVITIES 13 (2017) (describ-
ing a developing program to be called "Legallink," through which social workers will be trained by lawyers to assist
clients); FAME Legal Clinic, FIRST AFR. METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF L.A., http://www.famechurch.org/
freelegal.html [https://perma.cc/MVM5-NFWB] (last visited May 13, 2018) (using lay advocates and law students,
supervised by lawyers, to deliver advice); Housing Advocates Training, FAIR HOUSING CENTER OF SOUTHEAST
AND MID-MICHIGAN, http://www.thcmichigan.org/get-involved/hat/#.WYw5XFGGM2x [https://perma.cc/DJD9-
XWCU] (last visited May 13, 2018) (training lay housing advocates). The more robust surrogate lawyering
projects to be described below have not yet been implemented, in part because of the ethical challenges discussed
in this Article.
4. See RICHARD E. SUSSKIND, TOMORROW'S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE 29,271 (2013)
(describing the diminishing role of an individualized, personalized legal service delivery model); Raymond H.
Brescia et al., Embracing Disruption: How Technological Change in the Delivery of Legal Services Can
Improve Access to Justice, 78 ALB. L. REV. 553, 612 (2015); Judith A. McMorrow, UK Alternative Business
Structures for Legal Practice: Emerging Models and Lessons for the US, 47 GEO. J. INT'L L. 665, 667-69
(2016).
5. See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (describing technology-based innovations).
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the model separates the lawyers from the "clients," 6 through the intermediary
staffers employed by community-based organizations (CBOs), ethics issues do
emerge. The most prominent are threefold: (1) the attorney-client relationship
and attendant duties between the legal services lawyers and the individuals
helped by the CBO staffers; (2) the prospect that this model involves the staffers
in the delivery of legal services without a license, creating an unauthorized prac-
tice of law (UPL) worry for the staffers and the lawyers assisting them; and (3)
the quality, or, to phrase it in the language of the ethics rules, the competence
questions arising from the model.
This Article will explore these three ethics topics in the following way. After a
brief review of the ATJ crises and the creative, usually technology-driven innova-
tions emerging in response to the crises, this Article describes the surrogacy
model. That model represents an ethical triage judgment about how best to
employ the scarce, finite resources available to public interest legal services pro-
viders. This Article examines, without an in-depth critique, that strategic choice.
It concludes that the choice will be, in appropriate circumstances, a principled
and justified allocation of attorney time and expertise. This Article then proceeds
to develop the three ethical issues that the model generates.
On the first issue, this Article concludes, albeit with some uncertainty, that the
model, structured carefully, does not create an inadvertent or implied attorney-
client relationship between the law firm and the recipients of the legal guidance.
It is true that legal advice, and often tailored advice, does travel between the law-
yers with the expertise to the individuals who rely on it. But the presence of the
intermediary and the absence of any knowledge by the law firm or by the "client"
of the other's identity means that the trappings of an attorney-client relationship
are absent. Nor does the law firm assume any fiduciary duties to the clients based
on agency considerations. Those assessments influence the resolution of the sec-
ond issue. With no attorney-client relationship between the legal services organi-
zation and the clients, but tailored legal advice provided to the clients, some of
that activity inevitably qualifies as the practice of law and, arguably, unauthorized
practice. This Article examines the limitations on nonlawyer advice to clients and
articulates what assistance is permitted and what is forbidden absent a supervising
lawyer with responsibility for the client matter. That analysis shows that much of
what the surrogacy model hopes to accomplish-that is, some useful suggestions
that will offer protections to the clients' interests in matters involving court-
related actions-qualifies, under just about every available definition, as the prac-
tice of law. This conclusion is worrisome, of course. For the CBO staffer, it raises
the prospect of civil or even criminal penalties for violation of the state's UPL
statutes; for the law firm, it exposes the lawyers to discipline for violation of the
6. As this Article discusses below, calling the recipients of the legal guidance "clients" represents a misno-
mer, but that term serves our purposes here. See infra note 41.
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rule, applicable in all states, that prohibits a licensed lawyer from assisting in
UPL.
A robust and effective surrogacy project must account for this apparent barrier
to its open operation. This Article addresses that barrier by exploring the third
legal ethics issue triggered by the model-that of competence. If the model is to
be defended, we must have some assurance that the advice communicated to the
clients by the nonlawyer staffers is sufficiently reliable to achieve the goals of the
project. This Article unpacks that competence question, searching for distinctions
within the universe of legal advice to discern what kinds of guidance the surro-
gacy model ought to provide, discourage, or prevent. This Article concludes that,
as others have noted, in many ways a savvy nonlawyer with some legal training
can be just as, if not more, effective than a licensed attorney in guiding low-
income individuals in distress.
If it is true, as this Article argues, that the surrogacy model has promise as an
effective addition to the access-to-justice campaign by providing effective guid-
ance to those who need legal help in an efficient way, the surrogacy model never-
theless still confronts the reality that the UPL laws as currently written, and
(sometimes) enforced, prohibit its explicit operation. The final part of this Article
considers some adjustments to the UPL regimes that would not bar a surrogacy
project, while also not sacrificing the principles and goals of the UPL doctrine.
This examination accepts, for present purposes, a premise that is in fact quite con-
tested in the literature-that UPL laws serve some justified, principled purposes
of protecting vulnerable consumers from shoddy and unethical purveyors of legal
services. Even accepting that premise as valid, this article surveys some possible
carve-out or safe-harbor provisions that would be workable, enforceable, and pro-
tective of the interests of the bar and of clients.
I. THE ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE CRISIS
A. THE NEED
Every reader knows all too well that a serious problem exists for low- and mod-
erate-income clients who encounter legal problems. Access to a lawyer, or to the
guidance that a lawyer can provide, is often essential to the protection of rights
and liberties.7 But lawyers are expensive.8 Employing a private lawyer to assist a
client with a contested legal matter can easily cost several thousands of dollars.9
7. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 240-48 (1988); Russell Engler, Turner
v. Rogers and the Essential Role of the Courts in Delivering Access to Justice, 7 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 31,
34-36 (2013) [hereinafter Engler, Turner].
8. See D. James Greiner et al., Self-Help, Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. 1119, 1122 (2017); Gillian K. Hadfield,
The Cost ofLaw: Promoting Access to Justice Through the (Un)corporate Practice ofLaw, 38 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 43,48 (2014).
9. See Milan Markovic, Juking Access to Justice to Deregulate the Legal Market, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
63, 75 (2016) ("[1]itigation can cost tens of thousands of dollars in the United States"); Victor Marrero, The
Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599, 1639 (2016) ("even a routine encounter between
2018] 381
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The advent of legal incubators has helped to develop delivery methods that are
much more affordable, 0 but even the lawyers participating in those settings must
still charge fees sufficient to earn a living wage and repay educational debt. 1
For the lowest-income Americans, the relative cost of private legal services
is almost irrelevant because they have insufficient resources to participate in
that market at all. 12 They require free legal services or some equivalent to assist
them as they navigate the complexities of the legal systems. As Stephen
Wexler famously observed, "poor people are always bumping into sharp legal
things." 13 The availability of conventional, community-based legal services is
shrinking by many reports, 14 but even in its most well-funded days it was
remarkably inadequate." The availability of private pro bono services does not
come close to making up the shortfall. Virtually all observers agree: 1 6 there is a
serious need for more and better access to legal services for lower-income per-
sons,1 7 especially in the crowded metropolitan courts, such as the housing, 8
family,1 9 debt-collection, 2 0 and immigration 2 1 fora.
B. THE RESPONSES
Efforts and proposals abound to respond to the serious need to provide guid-
ance to those who cannot afford a lawyer when they need one. Most of those
efforts fall into four camps. First, and most obviously, observers urge state and
the litigants could generate legal fees amounting to tens of thousands of dollars"); Rebecca L. Sandefur,
Moderate Income Households' Use of Lawyers' Services, in MIDDLE INCOME ACCESS To JUSTICE 224
(Trebilock et al. eds, 2012).
10. See Luz E. Herrera, Encouraging the Development of "Low Bono" Law Practices, 14 U. MD. L.J.
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1, 28-30 (2014).
11. Id. at 13-14.
12. See AM. BAR Ass'N, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS (1994); Brenda Star
Adams, "Unbundled Legal Services": A Solution to the Problems Caused by Pro Se Litigation in
Massachusetts's Civil Courts, 40 NEw ENG. L. REV. 303, 304 (2005).
13. Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1050 (1970).
14. See Sameer M. Ashar, Deep Critique and Democratic Lawyering in Clinical Practice, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 201, 209 (2016) ("the austerity regime of a shrinking government sector has hit legal services and public
defender offices hard"); Chris Johnson, Leveraging Technology to Deliver Legal Services, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 259, 281 (2009) (noting "overburdened and shrinking legal aid groups").
15. LUBAN, supra note 7, at 241-43.
16. The assertion in the text is no doubt an overstatement. See, e.g., Markovic, supra note 9 (challenging the
notion that cost of counsel is the most significant hindrance).
17. Rhode, Delivery, supra note 2, at 219.
18. See MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2016); Russell
Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is
Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37 (2010).
19. See Bos. BAR Ass'N, STATEWIDE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND CIVIL LEGAL AID IN MASS., INVESTING IN
JUSTICE: A ROADMAP TO COST-EFFECTIVE FUNDING OF CIVIL LEGAL AID IN MASSACHUSETTS 3 (2014).
20. See Ron Smith, Unauthorized Corporate Law Practices in Small Claims Court: Should Anybody Care?,
33 WASHBURN L.J. 345 (1994).
21. See Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the Immigration
Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 551, 568 (2011).
382
2018] SURROGATE LAWYERING 383
federal lawmakers to fund the subsidized legal services network in a more sus-
tainable fashion.2 2 Those efforts are unlikely to have much success given the cur-
rent and foreseeable political climate.2 3 Second, calls continue for more pro bono
services from the private bar, even if some uncertainty remains about the effec-
tiveness of pro bono as a delivery system. 24 The prospects of much success in that
area are not promising, since even a large increase in pro bono activity is unlikely
to make a noticeable difference. 25 Third, an organized and well-developed cam-
paign has emerged in recent years for what its proponents call "Civil Gideon," a
right to state-funded counsel in those legal areas whose importance rivals that of
criminal defense.26 While some states have implemented Civil Gideon laws in
recent years,2 7 few observers foresee much short-term benefit from that avenue.2 8
The fourth response is possibly the most vibrant and actualized. It
consists of the development of technological devices and programs that can
deliver legal services, or the functional equivalent of legal services, to per-
sons who do not have access to a lawyer when they need one. Building off the
success of computer-based legal assistance like LegalZoom 29 and Rocket
22. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004); JEANNE CHARN & RICHARD ZORZA, THE BELLOW-
SACKS ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES PROJECT, CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR ALL AMERICANS 14-17
(2005).
23. See Liza Q. Wirtz, The Ethical Bar and the LSC: Wrestling with Restrictions, 59 VAND. L. REV. 971,
1015 (2006).
24. See Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2004); Scott L. Cummings &
Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Pro Bono: Doing Well by Doing Better, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2357, 2370
(2010).
25. See Kendra Emi Nitta, An Ethical Evaluation of Mandatory Pro Bono, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 909, 923
(1995). As Leslie Levin has noted, "[E]ven if every lawyer in the country performed 100 hours of pro bono
work annually, it would not fill the enormous gap in the need for legal services." Leslie Levin, The Monopoly
Myth and Other Tales About the Superiority ofLawyers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2614 (2014).
26. See, e.g., David J. Dreyer, Dejd Vu All Over Again: Turner v. Rogers and the Civil Right to Counsel, 61
DRAKE L. REV. 639 (2013); Engler, Turner, supra note 7. See also Rebecca Aviel, Why Civil Gideon Won't Fix
Family Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2106 (2013).
27. See Paul Marvy & Debra Gardner, A Civil Right to Counsel for the Poor, 32-SUM HUM. RTS. 8 (2005);
Louis S. Rulli, On the Road to Civil Gideon: Five Lessons from the Enactment of a Right to Counsel for
Indigent Homeowners in Federal Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, 19 J.L. & POL'Y 683, 685 (2011) (describing
the states' efforts); Steven D. Schwinn, Faces of Open Courts and the Civil Right to Counsel, 37 U. BALT. L.
REV. 21, 58 (2007).
28. See Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access
to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 970 (2012). The prospect of significant progress on the ATJ front through a
Civil Gideon project is not great, as even committed ATJ theorists concede. The likelihood of comprehensive
provision of subsidized counsel for civil matters is rather slim in the current political climate. See Benjamin H.
Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1231 (2010) ("Civil
Gideon is ... very unlikely to occur."). Furthermore, the most viable proposals for a civil right to counsel leave
many individuals and issues unaddressed. See ABA House of Delegates Resolution 112A, Aug. 7, 2006, avail-
able at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administra-tive/legal aid indigent defendants/Issclaid
resolution 06al 12a.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5UB-84QN] (urging legislation requiring appointment
of counsel only in "categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake. . ."); Elizabeth L.
MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People's Courts, 22 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 473,
504(2015).
29. LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/ [https://perma.cc/JA4V-QYMH] (last visited Jan. 30,2018).
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Lawyer,3 0 social entrepreneurs are developing computer programs and smart-
phone apps that can direct users to the appropriate places, forms, and
guidance when they encounter identified legal controversies or needs.3 1
Courthouses are installing kiosks for use by litigants and other visitors,32 and
legal aid organizations are providing advice to clients through on-line chat-
room arrangements.3 3 Some of the more creative efforts in this regard include
"hackathons," where coders and legal services experts combine their exper-
tise to develop programs that can meet client needs in specified substantive or
procedural areas.3 4
What these efforts to respond to the ocean of need have in common is their reli-
ance on lawyers or lawyer-overseen computer programs to provide the help
needed by those enmeshed in the legal system. That kind of response makes intui-
tive sense, particularly given the increasing complexity of the legal systems that
all Americans confront.35 A different, but complementary, reaction to the ATJ
crisis has been the plea for better use of nonlawyers in the provision of certain ba-
sic legal services.36 Lawyers are expensive, both because legal education is
expensive3 7 and because of the monopoly of the marketplace.38 Lay advocates
can, for those reasons, provide assistance in a more affordable way.3 9 Jurisdictions
have been experimenting with tailored plans that permit nonlawyers to provide in-
dependent services that might otherwise be considered legal services to customers,
if certain licensing and consumer-protection requirements have been met.4 0
See generally Isaac Figueras, The LegalZoom Identity Crisis: Legal Form Provider or Lawyer in Sheep's
Clothing?, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1419 (2013).
30. ROCKET LAWYER, https://www.rocketlawyer.com/ [https://perma.cc/C5Y7-ZRB5] (last visited Jan. 30,
2018).
31. See Brescia et al., supra note 4; Michael J. Wolf, Collaborative Technology Improves Access to Justice,
15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIs. & PUB. PoL'Y 759 (2012).
32. See REBECCA SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA: FIRST REPORT OF THE CIVIL
JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING PROJECT 3 (2011); Engler, Turner, supra note 7 (discussing the role of
court clerks as well as court technology); Deborah L. Rhode, What We Know and Need to Know About the
Delivery of Legal Services by Nonlawyers, 67 S.C. L. REv. 429, 437 (2016) [hereinafter Rhode, What We
Know].
33. Cf Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to Lawyers, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1287, 1305 (2013).
34. See Brescia et al., supra note 4, at 595-96.
35. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Profession and Its Discontents, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1335, 1337 (2000) ("In
many fields of law, increasing complexity has encouraged increasing specialization. Lawyers know more and
more about less and less, and their intellectual horizons have correspondingly narrowed."); Wirtz, supra note
23, at 1011 (noting "a legal system growing ever more complex").
36. See Deborah J. Cantrell, The Obligation of Legal Aid Lawyers to Champion Practice by Nonlawyers, 73
FORDHAM L. REv. 883 (2004); Rhode, What We Know, supra note 32.
37. Paul Campos, The Crisis of the American Law School, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 177, 182-83 (2012).
38. Jack P. Sahl, Cracks in the Profession's Monopoly Armor, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 2635 (2014).
39. See Richard Zorza & David Udell, New Roles for Non-Lawyers to Increase Access to Justice, 41
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1259 (2014).
40. See Lori W. Nelson, LLLT-Limited License Legal Technician: What It Is, What It Isn't, and the Grey
Area in Between, 50 FAM. L.Q. 447 (2016) (cataloguing those initiatives).
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The model to be described and assessed here fits within the world of expanded
lay lawyering. As we shall see, it differs from the typical lay advocate regimes in
some notable ways. The next section will describe the surrogate lawyering pro-
ject, showing its likely benefits but also its ethical challenges.
II. SURROGATE LAWYERING
A. A SAMPLE SURROGATE LAWYERING PROJECT
A particularly innovative ATJ response aims to combine the expertise of public
interest lawyers with the availability and sophistication of staff members of
community-based social service agencies and institutions to effectively reach
more "clients"41 in need. To help us frame the discussion, let us imagine such an
arrangement:
Montrose Community Legal Assistance (MCLA) is a state-funded"2 legal
services organization whose mission is to provide access to legal services to
low-income residents of Essex County in civil legal matters. MCLA has two
neighborhood offices and a staff of fifteen lawyers, seven paralegals, and a
group of administrators and support personnel. Its traditional model of provid-
ing legal services has been a tailored mix of direct client representation, brief
service through clinics and lawyer-for-the day programs,"3 and "impact" work,
including focused case representation and class action-type projects.' The
nonprofit also coordinates with the state bar to encourage pro bono services
that might complement its efforts. While it accomplishes a great deal through
these services, MCLA's staff is discouraged that so many litigants within
Essex County remain without counsel. The vast majority of litigants in the
county family and housing courts appear pro se, and the wait list for MCLA
direct representation services remains unacceptably high.
MCLA has now embarked on a pilot project to increase the number of individ-
uals it might assist. It has reassigned four of its fifteen lawyers from direct rep-
resentation and brief services work to a new project it has dubbed Lay
41. I remind readers that, for purposes of this Article, I will refer to the recipients of the filtered, "surrogate"
legal services as "clients" for ease of discussion, without assuming (and, in fact, denying) that the individuals
will qualify as clients of the public interest law firm from which the legal advice originates.
42. After Congress imposed severe restrictions in the mid-1990s on the activities of legal aid programs
receiving federal funds from the Legal Services Corporation, many organizations dropped their federal funding
and arranged for state and nonprofit resources to support their work. In all such jurisdictions, separate organiza-
tions emerged that would accept the federal funding and comply with the Congressional restrictions, which
included limits on representation of undocumented immigrants, on welfare reform challenges, and on mainte-
nance of class actions. For a discussion of that strategy, see Wirtz, supra note 23, at 992-98.
43. "Lawyer-for-the-day" programs are a common form of legal assistance provision, typically involving
volunteer lawyers setting up advice tables at busy courthouses (usually family, housing, or debt-collection) at
which they can provide brief advice to litigants who have come to court for a civil legal event. See Russell
Engler, And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators,
and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1987, 1999-2000 (1999).
44. Much commentary has assessed the best way for a legal aid organization like MCLA to use its finite
resources in the most effective way. For a sampling of that literature, see, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 7, at 347-54.
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Advisors for Community Involvement, or LACI. The LACI lawyer team will
spend most of its time researching those community-based settings where the
MCLA client population tends to appear, including the domestic violence pre-
vention programs, homeless shelters, neighborhood health centers, senior cen-
ters, immigrant rights advocacy groups, community hospitals, and similar
local service organizations. LACI will then propose to train the street-level
staffers and the service providers at the CBOs to recognize and to respond to
the typical legal issues that their clientele encounter, including eviction and
housing condition worries; welfare, food stamps and disability benefits prob-
lems; family law matters including custody and visitation disputes and child
support enforcement; domestic violence and elder abuse and exploitation; im-
migration enforcement concerns; unfair debt collection; and wage-and-hour
mistreatment and similar employment problems.
Most of the lawyers' time will be spent not representing any clients directly or
filing or defending lawsuits, but instead in developing training methods for
staffers, who will include professionals-such as social workers, mental health
providers, nurses, geriatric specialists, librarians, doctors, etc.-and nonpro-
fessional case workers, receptionists, aides, and support staff. The training pro-
tocols will include printed materials (including handouts to be distributed to
the clients and more detailed manuals for use by the staffers), workshops, and
computer programs and apps that respond to the issues likely to arise in a given
setting. Along with the training, the lawyers will then serve as back-up support
for the staffers on an as-needed basis, to answer telephone calls or email inqui-
ries from staffers as they encounter nuances and specific problems whose reso-
lution is less clear.
The LACI program will coordinate with MCLA's direct representation com-
ponent and its pro bono services program, in that staffers may refer individuals
who have the greatest need for direct representation to MCLA in the hope of
obtaining a lawyer's help. But MCLA recognizes that this possibility is
remote. Most of the clients assisted through LACI will never have a relation-
ship with a lawyer-but, MCLA recognizes, they would not have had an indi-
vidual lawyer prior to LACI's establishment.
With that example in mind, let us assess the ethical implications, and the risks
and benefits, of this kind of ATJ arrangement.
B. THE TRIAGE CONSIDERATIONS
The rationale for LACI within MCLA has several elements. MCLA is commit-
ted to using its finite legal resources in a manner that does the most good for its
client community.4 5 Assigning some of its full-time lawyers to LACI ensures that
many more clients will receive some legal guidance and support than would occur
if MCLA assigned the lawyers to direct representation or even to a series of brief
45. See Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 1101 (1990).
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services programs. The CBO staffers will see many more clients than the lawyers
would ever see in their various institutional settings, and they will encounter legal
problems, or potential legal problems, in real time. The staffers often will have
genuine relationships with the clients and accompanying trust that can be a chal-
lenge within legal aid settings.46 The staffers will also appreciate the context for
the issues in ways that would be harder for lawyers who might meet the clients at,
say, an eviction clinic or at a lawyer-for-the-day table. The blend of legal guid-
ance and social service provision also promises a more holistic and integrated
approach to the client's difficulties.
The LACI project has significant advantages over the technology programs
that it will ordinarily include within its structure. While smartphone apps, com-
puter programs, and courthouse kiosks provide useful, decision-tree functional
guidance to litigants, sometimes in a far superior way to even a lawyer's help,47
those vehicles have disadvantages that the surrogate model hopes to address.
Besides the concern that not all low-income clients who need the help have
adequate access to smartphone technology and sufficient internet connectivity, 48
the technological solutions lack the interpersonal touch that staffers can pro-
vide. 49 The staff interactions can be more tailored, personalized, and iterative,
given their ability to address nuance, respond to changing circumstances, and
attend to the cultural background of the client.
For these reasons MCLA has opted to allocate a significant portion of its avail-
able legal resources to LACI. Its staff has concluded that the benefits to the client
community of the widespread and responsive access to legal guidance that LACI
represents outweighs the cost of forfeiting the direct representation that the
MCLA lawyers would otherwise provide. For purposes of this Article, we may
accept that triage judgment as justified and principled.0
46. See Robert K. Vischer, Big Law and the Marginalization of Trust, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 165, 168
(2012).
47. The most impressive advantage of the technology-based provision of legal guidance is that the pro-
gram can know pretty much everything, in an accurate and immediate fashion, compared to the inevitably-
incomplete memory and pattern recognition of even the most experienced lawyer. In addition, an effective
decision-tree quality of a program will respond appropriately to the specific information provided by the
user, leading to reliable information and forms generated by the program. See Louise Ellen Teitz, Providing
Legal Services for the Middle Class in Cyberspace: The Promise and Challenge of On-line Dispute
Resolution, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 985, 1016 (2001). For a discussion of court-based technology, see Russell
Engler, Nonlawyer Forms ofAssistance, in MIDDLE INCOME ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE COLLOQUIUM 145 (M.
Trebilcock, Anthony Duggan & Lome Sossin eds., 2012).
48. Cf. James E. Cabral et al., Using Technology to Enhance Access to Justice, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 241,
256 (2012).
49. Cf. Cantrell, supra note 36, at 888-89.
50. Legal services organizations like MCLA need to make such judgment calls about resource allocation all
the time. For a discussion of that responsibility, see, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 7, at 347-54; I. Glenn Cohen,
Rationing Legal Services, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 221, 222 (2013); Jeffrey Selbin et al., Service Delivery,
Resource Allocation, and Access to Justice: Greiner and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 45 (2012).
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Additionally, the LACI model includes a necessary component of backup by
the MCLA lawyers to respond to questions by staffers. The LACI model antici-
pates that most staffers will assist their constituents through the use of the limited
expertise they possess as a result of their work for their agency and the trainings
and materials provided by the LACI lawyers. But, with some regularity the
staffers will be spurred to search for more detailed, or more sophisticated, legal
understanding in order to help a client with an urgent or atypical legal problem.
The LACI model includes a commitment to the staffers that allows them to con-
sult with the lawyers, either by email, telephone, or on occasion in person, to
refine the guidance they will offer to the constituent. Here is one example of the
model's effectiveness and propriety:
Daria Bond, with a B.A. in political science, has been working for the past
eighteen months as a staff assistant at HelpingPartners, a food pantry and
homeless center in Essex County. She plans on applying for graduate school in
social work soon. She has come to know Maria Jackson, a regular visitor to the
center. Maria is disabled, receives a monthly SSI check and SNAP benefits,
and lives in a rooming house nearby. She comes to the center for food and
companionship.
Last week, Maria came to the center with a paper she received under her door,
from the Essex County Housing Court. The paper includes the word "default,"
and is easily recognized as a court judgment for eviction. Daria knows the
basics about how the eviction process works, including how tenants file
answers and prepare for their hearing date. She also knows that tenants who
default may file a motion to attempt to get out from under that judgment. But
that is an area in which Daria is far less comfortable (compared to the typical
questions about the standard court filings and procedures). So, Daria emails
MCLA to get advice from one of the LACI attorneys, but does not reveal
Maria's name or any other identifying information.
Wendy Perlstein, a staff lawyer at MCLA assigned to the LACI project,
responds to Daria's questions. Wendy explains that a tenant like Maria can get
a hearing on a "motion to remove default" if she files certain papers quickly.
The forms can be generated through a program that MCLA has made available
to HelpingPartners. Wendy adds the following summary: "The bottom line: If
your client had good reason for not appearing at the court hearing, and gets the
papers filed on time and properly, she has a reasonable shot of getting this
default removed."
In her email, Wendy cautions Daria not to reveal to her client the identity of
the lawyer or law firm that has provided the advice. Wendy's email includes
this suggestion:
"I give you permission to cut and paste my response, explaining to the client
that you consulted with a colleague who has a lot of housing law experience
and who shared the following information: [then insert what I have given you].
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We want your client to have the information, but we don't want her to have the
misimpression that she has a lawyer representing her now.""
Daria proceeds to advise Maria about her rights and shares Wendy's language
with her, but never discloses Wendy's identity or where she works. Daria then
assists Maria to complete a motion document to file with the Housing Court.
The example of Maria, Daria, and Wendy crystallizes the tensions inherent in
the operation of a surrogacy delivery system. What follows is an effort to unpack
the ethical complexity of this innovative effort.
III. AN ETHICS ANALYSIS OF SURROGATE LAWYERING
It is a truism that the LACI model just described ought to comply with the ethi-
cal obligations of the lawyers administering it, as well as any other state laws ap-
plicable to its participants. It is equally true, though, that the innovations crafted
by creative public interest practitioners might benefit from operating more in the
shadows, without inviting scrutiny from the organized bar saddled with its
entrenched interests.5 2 For present purposes, let us explore the tensions that will
arise. The surrogacy model invites scrutiny on two ethical risks-the concern on
the part of the lawyers that an inadvertent attomey-client relationship has been
created, and the danger that the lawyers have assisted in the unauthorized practice
of law.
A. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP QUESTION
The first tension that must be addressed is whether the LACI project inadver-
tently establishes an attomey-client relationship between MCLA and the clients
who benefit from the legal advice provided by the staffers. For purposes of this
analysis, let us assume as true a premise that the next subsection will unpack-
that the legal guidance provided from the MCLA lawyers to the clients through
the CBO staffers counts as legal advice. The question becomes particularly in-
triguing in those settings where the staffer seeks further clarifying information
from the MCLA lawyers.
1. WHY THE RELATIONSHIP QUESTION MATTERS
Let us first explore why this question matters. If the MCLA lawyers
have established an attomey-client relationship by providing advice through the
surrogates, then certain commitments, duties, and limitations ensue. Those
51. This exchange is a variation and revised account of an actual transaction in a program for which I have
consulted, and which is seeking to develop a LACI-type project.
52. The recent innovation described by Michele Cotton, with its surrogacy elements but unfavorable reac-
tions from bar officials, may serve as an apt example of this sentiment. See Michele Cotton, Experiment,
Interrupted: Unauthorized Practice ofLaw Versus Access to Justice, 5 DEPAUL J. FOR Soc. JUSTICE 179 (2012)
(describing the Legal and Ethical Studies (LEST) project, using social workers to guide persons with legal
needs, and its critical treatment by the state Attorney General).
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implications involve competence, confidentiality, and avoidance of conflicts of
interests.5 3 A brief review will demonstrate that only the latter duty has any con-
straining relevance in the LACI setting. Because of that one duty, though, MCLA
prefers to craft a program that does not implicate an implied attorney-client
relationship.
Competence: If the LACI project means that the recipients of the filtered
advice are clients of MCLA, then the MCLA lawyers owe duties of competence
to them.54 That duty could be enforced not just through the lawyer disciplinary
process," but through an action for legal malpractice if the client suffered dam-
ages as a result of the sub-standard service.56 If the recipient is not a client of the
law firm, then malpractice liability would most likely not arise. It might appear
that MCLA would therefore have an interest in avoiding a finding of an inadver-
tent client relationship in order to avoid the risk of such liability. However, that is
likely not so. Whatever the risks involved in its development of the LACI project,
avoidance of malpractice claims should not be one that animates MCLA." This
prediction is premised on two related considerations. First, if LACI is to serve its
goals, it will need to deliver competent services, and presumably the organization
would accept responsibility if its systems failed to do so.5 9 Second, the LACI pro-
ject likely establishes some attorney-client relationship with someone, most likely
the agencies where the staffers work.60 If the staffers provide less-than-competent
53. Susan Martyn describes the implications of lawyers having established a cognizable attomey-client rela-
tionship as "the 4 C's, which mean that they must communicate adequately, give competent advice, keep the
client's confidences, and resolve conflicts." Susan R. Martyn, Accidental Clients, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 929
(2005). For our present purposes, the communication duty is far less of an issue, given the complete lack of con-
tact between the law firm and the client beneficiary. The other three Cs do have relevance, as the following text
describes.
54. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2016) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
55. Lawyers who provide less-than-competent service to clients may face discipline by the bar regulatory
authorities. See, e.g., In re Fru, 829 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 2013); Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Sperling, 69 A.3d
478 (Md. 2013); Matter of Sharif, 945 N.E.2d 922 (Mass. 2011).
56. See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980); RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY § 1.1-2(a), (b) (2012-2013 ed.).
57. The general rule is that non-clients may not assert malpractice claims against lawyers. See, e.g.,
Goldberg v. Frye, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 1266 (1990); Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d 542 (Mass. 1994). In some
limited settings, a non-client might successfully assert a duty of care. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (2000). Section 51(3) of the Restatement may be read to apply to the surrogacy
arrangement. That provision permits a claim against a lawyer by a nonclient when "the lawyer knows that a cli-
ent intends as one of the primary objectives of the representation that the lawyer's services benefit the non-
client." Id. at § 51(3)(a). If the CBO is a client of MCLA (as seems likely; see discussion at infra notes 110-32
and accompanying text), then the CBO's clients may have claims against the lawyer for professional
negligence.
58. Whether the law firm's malpractice liability insurer would agree with the assessment in the text is a dif-
ferent matter. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall ofLegal Ethics and the Rise ofRisk Management, 94 GEO.
L. J. 1909 (2006) (describing the influence of professional liability institutions on lawyer management and
conduct).
59. I have heard from organizational leaders developing a LACI-type program that this is so.
60. That proposition receives examination below. See infra notes 116-36 and accompanying text.
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service and a client suffers harm, and a lawsuit then arises, the CBO would likely
be a defendant, and that party would no doubt implead MCLA if there were any
colorable claims that MCLA provided less than competent legal advice given its
responsibilities within the LACI project.61
For these reasons, the competence question-while one that plays a central
role in assessing the wisdom of a LACI-type program, as this Article explores
later 62 -is not one that serves as the basis of MCLA's need to avoid the inadver-
tent establishment of an attomey-client relationship.
Confidentiality: A second byproduct of an attomey-client relationship between
MCLA and the recipient of the legal information would be an accompanying
duty of confidentiality. The MCLA lawyers owe a duty to those who qualify as
clients not to disclose to others any "information related to the [client's] represen-
tation."63 This should not be a worry for the MCLA lawyers, even if the substan-
tive law deemed an attomey-client relationship to exist by implication. The
operation of LACI separates the lawyers from the clients, and the MCLA lawyers
therefore do not learn any information that they would then have to safeguard.64
In a conventional attomey-client relationship, the shared understanding of the
operation of Rule 1.6 is that a lawyer may discuss with others some otherwise-
protected client information as long as the lawyer sanitizes the information so
that no client-identifying material is disclosed.65 The LACI arrangement does not
include the lawyer's learning the identity of any clients who receive the guidance
from the staffers, so the lawyers have no information to protect.6 6
Avoidance of Conflicts: The third component of an attorney-client relationship
that would have implications for LACI and MCLA is that of conflicts of interest.
In general, an attorney must avoid conflicts of interest with her clients, both cur-
rent67 and, in more limited fashion, former.68 This is the one byproduct of an
61. A defendant in civil litigation may implead "a person who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him." MASS. R. CIv. P. 14(a). See, e.g., Ford v. Flaherty, 305 N.E.2d 112, 115-16
(Mass. 1973). The fact that the CBO's clients may qualify as nonclients to whom the law firm owes a duty of
competence (see supra note 57) further supports this understanding.
62. See infra notes 192-205 and accompanying text.
63. MODEL RuLES R. 1.6(a).
64. At the same time, if the CBO is considered a client of MCLA (an issue that we reach below), any infor-
mation that the MCLA lawyer would learn about the client through communication with the staffer would be
protected by the organizational attomey-client privilege. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
65. MODEL RULES R. 1.6(a) cmt. 4. See Alexis Anderson, Arlene Kanter & Cindy Slane, Ethics in
Externships: Confidentiality, Conflicts, and Competence Issues in the Field and in the Classroom, 10 CLINICAL
L. REv. 473, 554 (2004); Kate Bloch, Subjunctive Lawyering and Other Clinical Extern Paradigms, 3
CLINICAL L. REv. 259, 277 (1997); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 411 (1998)
(concluding that hypothetical or anonymous consultations are preferred).
66. If the LACI arrangement did imply an attomey-client relationship (and the next subsection concludes
that it does not), and if a staffer mistakenly disclosed to the MCLA lawyer the name of the affected client, then
the lawyer's Rule 1.6 duties would apply in the usual fashion.
67. See MODEL RULES R. 1.7, 1.8.
68. See MODEL RULES R. 1.9.
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attorney-client relationship that would have the most serious effect on the opera-
tion of a surrogate lawyering project like LACI.
Described broadly, the conflicts provisions of the Model Rules prohibit a law-
yer and her law firm6 9 from opposing a current client on any matter, and from
opposing a former client on a matter that is substantially related to the work the
law firm performed for that former client.70 If every person assisted through
LACI, or even if every person assisted through a follow-up consultation between
an MCLA lawyer and an LACI staffer, were deemed to be a client of MCLA, that
conclusion would effectively cripple the LACI project.
Consider, as a simple example, a question posed by a CBO staffer to a MCLA
lawyer on behalf of a mother regarding the interpretation and enforcement conse-
quences of a visitation order involving the father of her child. If that mother is
deemed to be a client of the law firm, then MCLA would be prohibited from repre-
senting, or even offering advice to, the father about his visitation rights, or perhaps
even his child support or custody rights, if the mother is considered a current or for-
mer client. Law firms have a duty to perform adequate conflict checks,7 1 lest they
find themselves engaged in an improper representation, requiring disqualification or
withdrawal.72 The only way that MCLA could perform conflict checks would be to
learn the identity of the clients whom the staffers are assisting. That requirement
would alter considerably the fluid, informal, filtered qualities of the LACI project.
For this reason, then, MCLA prefers that its surrogate lawyering arrangement
not deem each assisted client to be a formal client of the MCLA law firm.
2. DOES LACI TRIGGER INADVERTENT ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS?
a. The Attorney-Client Relationship Test
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers articulates the
accepted criteria for determining whether an attorney-client relationship exists.
The Restatement declares:
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when:
(1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer provide
legal services for the person; and either
(a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or
69. See MODEL RULES R. 1.10.
70. See MODEL RULES R. 1.7, 1.9. The discussion in the text oversimplifies the complex doctrine of conflicts
avoidance, but the description serves the purposes intended here.
71. MODEL RULES R. 1.7 cmt. 2; ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-455 (2009)
(noting the duty when lawyers change firms); Oregon State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. No. 2011-183
(2011) (noting the duty when providing unbundled legal services); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Formal
Op. 12-03 (2012), available at 2012 WL 1142185 (noting the duty).
72. See, e.g., Koch Industries Inc. v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft, 650 F. Supp. 2d 282, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(insufficient conflict checking may lead to a firm's disqualification).
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(b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer
to provide the services . .. .7
Courts have implemented this standard to hold that lawyers have duties to per-
sons that they did not otherwise consider clients. For instance, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court has stated that an attomey-client relationship may be
implied, "when (1) a person seeks advice or assistance from an attorney, (2) the
advice or assistance sought pertains to matters within the attorney's professional
competence, and (3) the attorney expressly or impliedly agrees to give or actually
gives the desired advice or assistance."74
Aside from conventional, express relationships, some common interactions
trigger the application of this test, and lawyers on occasion find themselves with
clients unexpectedly." Some settings are rather easy to assess. For example,
authorities agree that "hotline-type" services, where public-interest organizations
or bar associations field brief-service telephone calls, do establish attomey-client
relationship duties, given that the lawyer directly provides guidance (even if, at
times, through paraprofessionals), in a tailored way.76 Legal seminars typically
do not generate inadvertent attomey-client relationships with those attending the
seminars," but could do so if the attorney presenting the material proffers
answers to specific participant questions about their rights." Internet "chat
rooms," where lawyers answer questions posed by users, and other internet
advice resources, may trigger duties if the lawyer fails to establish sufficient dis-
claimers.7 9 An effort to "crowdsource" legal information (and often legal advice)
73. RESTATEMENT, supra note 57, at § 14.
74. DeVaux v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 444 N.E.2d 355, 357 (Mass. 1983) (quoting Kurtenbach v. TeKippe,
260 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1977)).
75. See Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the Promise, 49
DUKE L.J. 147, 168-95 (1999) [hereinafter Lanctot, Cyberspace].
76. See, e.g., Martyn, supra note 53, at 929; Kan. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics/Advisory Servs., Op. 92-06
(1992) (advising a for-profit "900 number" "Dial-a-Lawyer" service, which charged callers at its typical hourly
rate, that the firm likely established attomey-client relationships). The drafters of the Model Rules recognized
that hotline-type programs implicate the duties to a client or a prospective client, and offered a relaxed rule
about conflict-checking for purposes of such programs. See MODEL RULES R. 6.5.
77. RONALD E. MALLEN, 1 LEGAL MALPRACTICE, Duty Existence of duty, § 8:4 (2017 ed.). See
Rosenbaum v. White, 692 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2012). But see Doe v. Condon, 532 S.E.2d 879, 882 (S.C. 2000)
(seminar on wills and trusts by a paralegal held to be UPL).
78. See, e.g., State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof'1 Conduct, Op. 92-10 (1992) ("It is improper for an
attorney, during the seminar to answer questions of laymen concerning their specific individual legal prob-
lems."); Fla. St. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 75-36 (1977) (a lawyer may not give legal advice on
particular legal problems to those attending a class covering general legal subjects). See Lanctot, Cyberspace,
supra note 75, at 233-34.
79. See generally Lanctot, Cyberspace, supra note 75, at 244-46; Martin Whittaker, Ethical Considerations
Related to Blogs, Chat Rooms, and Listservs, 21 THE PROF. LAw., no. 2, 2012, at 3, 5; Ronald D. Rotunda,
Applying The Revised ABA Model Rules in the Age of the Internet: The Problem of Metadata, 42 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 175, 189 (2013). See also N.M. Bar Op. 2001-1 (2001) (attorneys may create attomey-client relationships
on the internet notwithstanding disclaimers).
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has appeared, but its implication for the triggering of duties has not yet been
tested.o For instance, the website MetaTalk offers a portal identified as
"IAALBIANYL,"s1 the acronym for "I Am a Lawyer But I Am Not Your
Lawyer," where law-related discussions may proliferate but without any user
having the right (or so the lawyer participants hope) to claim any reliance or any
fiduciary protections.8
Law firms recognize the serious concern that an invitation to prospective cli-
ents to share information when inquiring about whether to retain the firm might
lead to the sharing of confidential information that the firm must then protect,
potentially triggering a damaging conflict of interest with a current client.83 That
concern led the ABA to adopt Model Rule 1.18, articulating protective measures
a firm may take to avoid conflicts.8 4
In light of that treatment of inadvertent or accidental client relationship forma-
tion, would the LACI arrangement be one that triggers such duties? The conclu-
sion suggested here is no." In all reported examples of inadvertent or deemed
attomey-client relationships, the attorney has some direct contact with the indi-
vidual receiving and acting upon the advice. That interface permits the purported
client to claim some reliance interest upon which the tort or contract theories of
attomey-client relationship formation rest. With the LACI arrangement, no such
interface exists, and the client has no knowledge of any lawyer offering any serv-
ices to him. The challenge is to discern whether that omission matters.
Because of LACI's innovative quality, no readily-available analogy exists by
which to assess the duties the MCLA lawyers might owe to the ultimate users of
80. See Benjamin H. Barton, The Lawyer's Monopoly-What Goes and What Stays, 82 FORDHAM L. REv.
3067, 3074-75 (2014) (discussing MetaTalk and Avvo); Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Facebook
Disruption: How Social Media May Transform Civil Litigation and Facilitate Access to Justice, 65 ARK. L.
REv. 75, 85 (2012) (discussing MetaTalk).
81. See Legal AskMe, METATALK, http://metatalk.metafilter.com/15513/IAALBIANYL [https://perma.cc/
JM5P-V32R] (Last visited April 7,2018).
82. For a discussion on this crowdsourcing phenomenon, see Robertson, supra note 80, at 83-86; Cassandra
Burke Robertson, Private Ordering in the Market for Professional Services, 94 B.U. L. REv. 179, 203 (2014).
83. See ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-457 (2010) (discussing lawyer web-
sites). In Barton v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Ctr. Dist. of Cal., the court concluded that information provided to a
law firm by prospective clients must remain confidential under the circumstances of the firm's solicitation
efforts, even though the solicitation by its terms "[did] not constitute a request for legal advice and that [the
user was] not forming an attorney client relationship by submitting this information." 410 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th
Cir. 2005).
84. MODEL RULES R. 1.18. It is safe to assume that in avoiding disqualifying conflicts by its compliance
with Rule 1.18's requirements, the law firm would at the same time ensure that it has not created an inadvertent
attomey-client relationship, which is a matter of common law and not governed by the ModelRules.
85. The conclusion developed here differs in some respects from a recent opinion of the Committee on
Professional Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. See NYCBA Formal Op. 2017-4,
Ethical Considerations for Legal Services Lawyers Working with Outside Non-Lawyer Professionals (2017)
[hereinafter NYCBA Op. 2017-4]. That opinion, discussing a surrogate-like arrangement, assumes a more
direct connection between the advising lawyer and the person receiving the advice as filtered through the staff
member.
394
SURROGATE LAWYERING
the filtered legal advice.8 6 The closest arrangement would be the lawyer consul-
tant. A review of the treatment of consultations among lawyers may help us to
assess the implications of the LACI arrangement.
A respected body of scholarship has addressed the duties of lawyer consul-
tants. 87 That status arises in three related contexts-a lawyer serving as a formal
expert witness or an expert consultant, a lawyer acting as an informal advisor,
and a faculty member (who may or may not be a licensed lawyer) advising stu-
dents and colleagues. The analyses of these settings inevitably include reference
to two not-fully-consistent ABA ethics opinions. Formal Op. 97-407 concluded
that a lawyer serving as a testifying expert has no attomey-client relationship with
the person for whom she testifies, while a consulting expert does form such an at-
torney client relationship." Formal Op. 98-411, issued the following year, stated
that a lawyer who offers consultation services to another lawyer about strategy or-
dinarily does not form an attomey-client relationship with that other lawyer's cli-
ent.8 9 This latter opinion never mentions Op. 97-407.90 Commentators have
grappled with the implications of the lawyer-consultant at some length, but for
present purposes, a brief summary will suffice.
All of the commentators concur, not surprisingly, that if the Restatement ele-
ments are met-the consulted lawyer provides legal advice to the consulting law-
yer's client, while receiving confidential information on which to base that
advice, and in such a way that the client is likely to rely on it-the consulted law-
yer ought to treat the client as her client as well, with all of the implications that
status generates. 91 That setting is relatively rare (outside of professor-student
interactions), or so the participants typically hope. If the consulted lawyer learns
no confidential information about the consulting lawyer's client, and offers
advice in hypothetical, sanitized fashion, then there is no resulting attomey-client
86. Compare id. (finding an attomey-client relationship between a lawyer and the recipient when the staff
member serves as a direct intermediary between the two, and the lawyer's identity is known to the recipient).
87. See, e.g., Samuel Dash, The Ethical Role and Responsibilities of a Lawyer-Ethicist Revisited: The Case
of the Independent Counsel's Neutral Expert Consultant, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1065 (2000); Bruce A. Green,
Reflections on the Ethics ofLegal Academics: Law Schools as MDPs; or Should Law Professors Practice What
They Teach?, 42 S. TEX. L. REv. 301 (2001); M.H. Hoeflich & Bill Skepnek, Reflections of an Ethics Expert
and a Lawyer Who Retains Him, 44 HOFSTRA L. REv. 353 (2015); Rory K. Little, Law Professors as Lawyers:
Consultants, of Counsel, and the Ethics of Self-Flagellation, 42 S. TEX. L. REv. 345 (2001); Nancy J. Moore,
The Ethical Role and Responsibilities of a Lawyer-Ethicist: The Case of the Independent Counsel's
Independent Counsel, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 771 (1999); Frederick C. Moss & William J. Bridge, Can We
Talk?: A "Steele-Y' Analysis of ABA Opinion 411, 52 S.M.U. L. REv. 683 (1999); Laura L. Rovner, The
Unforeseen Ethical Ramifications of Classroom Faculty Participation in Law School Clinics, 75 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1113 (2007).
88. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-407 (1997).
89. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 98-411 (1998).
90. As commentators have noted, the two opinions are difficult to reconcile. See Moss & Bridge, supra note
87, at 686-89.
91. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 87, at 781-82; Moss & Bridge, supra note 87, at 687; Rovner, supra note
87,at 1126-27.
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relationship. 92 In that setting, the consulted lawyer has no duties or limitations,
except for those that a contractual agreement with the consulting lawyer may
impose.93
Observers agree, though, that interactions can, and do, fall between those two
relatively manageable paradigm cases. A consulting lawyer will at times consult
another lawyer for advice and share some cabined confidential information,
requesting that the consulted lawyer promise to keep that information secret
(sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly94 ). The effect of that contractual
arrangement should not, according to the authorities, generate a full attorney-
client relationship between the consulted lawyer and the client.95 The agreement
does, however, implicate conflict of interest concerns for the consulted lawyer.
That lawyer might not be permitted to represent a different individual with inter-
ests adverse to the consulting lawyer's client if the confidential information
would be relevant.96
None of the worries identified by commentary about consulting arrangements
should arise with the LACI interactions. The client and the lawyer have no com-
munication that would lead to reliance by the client on the lawyer's guidance, as
described earlier. 97 Because the consulting CBO staffer shares no identifying in-
formation with the MCLA lawyer, confidential or otherwise, the limitations
articulated by the ABA's ethics opinions and the commentators do not come into
play.
Discussion of consulting arrangements, when concluding that an inadvertent
attomey-client relationship has been properly circumvented by the lawyers
involved, often warns that the analysis does not end there.98 The participants, and
especially the consulted lawyer, must consider the agency law implications of the
consultations.9 9 We therefore need to consider whether agency doctrine affects
the responsibilities of the MCLA lawyers.
b. Agency Implications
As just described, a lawyer consultant advising another lawyer about the lat-
ter's client will typically take all steps necessary to prevent an attomey-client
relationship with that client. Even if the consultant succeeds in that goal, com-
mentators point out that she may, nonetheless, assume duties not entirely
92. See Formal Op. 98-411, supra note 89; Moss & Bridge, supra note 87, at 688.
93. Moss & Bridge, supra note 87, at 692.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. See also Moore, supra note 87, at 790-91; Formal Op. 98-411, supra note 89.
97. See supra notes 73- 78 and accompanying text.
98. See Moore, supra note 87, at 787-93; Moss & Bridge, supra note 87, at 696; Rovner, supra note 87, at
1133-43.
99. See Moore, supra note 87, at 790-91; Rovner, supra note 87, at 1136-39.
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different from those accompanying the attomey-client relationship. That is
because of the agency implications of the consultation.
The argument presented by the commentators proceeds as follows. The con-
sulting lawyer is an agent of his client, the principal. As an agent, he owes fiduci-
ary duties to the principal, including a duty of loyalty and a duty of care. When he
retains a consultant to assist him, that consultant qualifies as a subagent-an
agent hired by an agent to assist in the performance of his duties. The subagent
owes fiduciary duties to the agent, according to the Restatement of Agency.0 0
The Restatement also provides, however, that the subagent owes some fiduciary
duties to the principal,0 1 including the duties of care and loyalty. In some consul-
tation arrangements, observers note, the consulted lawyer will therefore owe to
the client some of the duties she would assume if she were the primary lawyer,
most notably the duty of loyalty. 10 2 The duty of loyalty in turn implicates conflict
of interest concerns. 10 3
The MCLA attorney advising the CBO staffer through the LACI program
might qualify as a subagent under this paradigm. If so, the preceding analysis,
concluding that the MCLA lawyer has no attomey-client relationship with the
ultimate agency constituent benefitting from the advice, may not be satisfactory.
The most serious concern for MCLA under this arrangement is the possibility of
a conflict of interest, as we saw above, and the subagent status can implicate
conflicts.
A moment's reflection shows, however, that the agency staffer is, under typical
circumstances, not an agent of the client. The MCLA lawyer therefore cannot be
a subagent. Even were the staffer to qualify as an agent, the MCLA lawyer would
not meet the definition of the staffer's subagent. The lack of notice to, and consent
(express or implied) of, the principal would eliminate that possibility. Therefore,
the agency concern appears to be unwarranted.104
A community organization staffer offering well-intended advice to a constitu-
ent is not an agent of the constituent. The Restatement of Agency defines
"agency" as follows: "[A] fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a
'principal') manifests assent to another person (an 'agent') that the agent shall act
on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent man-
ifests assent or otherwise consents so to act."o
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.15(1) & cmt. d (2006).
101. Id. at § 8.01 cmt. c ("A subagent owes fiduciary duties to the principal as well as to the appointing
agent."). See also id. at § 3.15(1), cmt. d.
102. See Moore, supra note 87, at 790.
103. See id. at 790-91.
104. One recent ethics committee did find that a staff person contacting a lawyer on behalf of a constituent
to clarify permissible legal advice about Medicaid application procedures did qualify as an agent of the constit-
uent. See NYCBA Op. 2017-4, supra note 85. In that setting, contrary to the arrangement described here, the
staffer expressly (and typically with the client present) offered to serve as a conduit of the advice from the law-
yer to the constituent, who thereby became a client of the lawyer. Id. at 3.
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, supra note 100 at § 1.01.
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One writer, relying on the Restatement's comment, adds to the definition:
The existence of an agency relationship instead is determined by parsing the
elements of agency: (1) a consensual relationship; (2) where one person is a
representative of another; (3) the representative has the "power to affect the
legal rights and duties of the other person"; and (4) the "person represented
has a right to control the actions of the agent." 106
The CBO staffer does not fit this definition in any meaningful way. The lack of
a retainer is not dispositive, 10 7 but the lack of control is critical.os The CBO
staffer advises his constituent, and does so for the benefit of the constituent (e.g.,
"You should apply for a housing voucher at this county office before the applica-
tion opportunity closes at the end of next week, and make sure you bring the fol-
lowing documents, or you will be turned away."). But the constituent has none of
the qualities of a principal. She cannot control the staffer and typically does not
empower the staffer to speak for her or to act for her.
At the same time, we must concede that the question is a bit more problematic
than that facile interpretation seems to show. Advisors often will qualify as
agents. For instance, lawyers are advisors, and they are agents.1 09 Broker-advisors
can be agents, and courts have imposed fiduciary duties upon them. 1 0 The differ-
ence between lawyers and broker-advisors, on the one hand, and helpful CBO
staffers, on the other, rests in the lack of a representative role. The agents perform
actions in lieu of the principal.11 They act for the principal, and do so at the direc-
tion of the principal. It is at that juncture that the element of control enters the pic-
ture. The staffer, unlike a true agent, merely advises the constituent, who may or
may not act on the advice.
That, at least, is the typical understanding of a street-level, community-based
agency staffer aiding the constituents who need the agency's services. If the
staffer were to contact the lawyer expressly on behalf of an identified client, seek-
ing advice from the lawyer to be provided to an identified constituent, the agency
relationship would be more apparent.1 12 Absent that explicit arrangement, no
106. Thomas Earl Geu, A Selective Overview ofAgency, Good Faith and Delaware Entity Law, 10 DEL. L.
REv. 17, 20 (2008) (quoting id. § 1.01 at cmt. c).
107. Agency is not dependent on the payment of fee or on an express written agreement. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY, supra note 100, at § 1.01.
108. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 301, 320 (1998) ("A defining ele-
ment of the common law relationship of agency is the principal's right to control the agent.").
109. Id. at 301; Adam Liptak, Agency and Equity: Why Do We Blame Clients for Their Lawyers' Mistakes?,
110 MICH. L. REV. 875 (2012). See William R. Mureiko, Note, The Agency Theory of the Attorney-Client
Relationship: An Improper Justification for Holding Clients Responsible for Their Attorneys' Procedural
Errors, 1988 DuKE L.J. 733 (1988).
110. See, e.g., Patsos v. First Albany Corp., 741 N.E.2d 841, 850 (Mass. 2001); Leib v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, supra note 100, at § 1.01; Redbird Eng'g Sales, Inc. v. Bi-State
Dev. Agency, 806 S.W.2d 695, 700 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
112. See NYCBA Op. 2017-4, supra note 85 (finding an agency relationship in that circumstance).
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authority has found such a staffer to be an agent generally of his constituent with
accompanying fiduciary duties.113
Furthermore, even if the staffer qualified as an agent by some interpretation of
his relationship with the constituent, under the LACI program, the MCLA lawyer
would not qualify as a subagent. Subagency status requires consent of the princi-
pal. The Restatement of Agency, in its Reporter's notes, states: "Unless a princi-
pal has explicitly or implicitly directed the retention of a subagent, an agent who
is hired by an agent to carry out the principal's work remains the hiring agent's
agent alone."114 The LACI arrangement by design maintains distance between
the client and the lawyer. The client/principal would not direct the CBO staffer to
retain the lawyer. Therefore, no sub-agency relationship arises. In addition, given
that the lawyer owes her fiduciary duties to the CBO that employs the staffer, as
the next section explains, the agency doctrine cannot overcome the bedrock pre-
mise that the employees of the CBO are not clients of the lawyer, and the lawyer
does not owe duties to them, apart from their role as constituents of the client.1
For purposes of evaluating the effects of a well-functioning LACI program, it
is prudent to conclude that the sub-agency status is not a concern. The MCLA
lawyers advising staffers through LACI are neither attorneys for the clients nor
subagents of the staffers.
c. The Relationship Between MCLA and the CBO
The discussion thus far has left one relationship unexamined: that between the
CBO and MCLA. If the MCLA lawyers do not represent the CBO's constituents
and are not subagents with duties to those constituents, who serves as the lawyers'
clients? Most likely, the CBO will qualify as a client of MCLA.
An attorney who expressly agrees to provide legal advice and training to a non-
lawyer most likely has established an attomey-client relationship with that non-
lawyer.116 MCLA ought therefore to treat each separate CBO as its client. The
reasoning for this conclusion is not without uncertainty, but any answer other
than the establishment of an attomey-client relationship is difficult to defend.
113. No reported case has held that a community organization staffer is an agent of the constituents served.
Cf. Nathan Witkin, Dependent Advocacy: Alternatives to Independence Between Attorneys, 32 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 111, 128 (2017) ("[W]hile social workers can assist clients in dealing with powerful government
agencies, they, unlike legal professionals, do not take on a fiduciary duty with regards to the forcible depriva-
tion of their clients' rights"). A licensed social worker will, of course, likely have mandated reporting duties
regarding incidents of abuse and neglect, as well as confidentiality duties, but those responsibilities are not the
subject of the present inquiry. See Naomi Schoenbaum, The Law of Intimate Work, 90 WASH. L. REv. 1167,
1207 (2015) (describing the duties of licensed social workers).
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, supra note 100, at Reporter's Notes, subsection c, Creation of sub-
agency (citing Estate of Smith v. Underwood, 487 S.E.2d 807, 815 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (dictum)).
115. See MODEL RULES R. 1.13(a); Eli Wald, Loyalty in Limbo: The Peculiar Case ofAttorneys' Loyalty to
Clients, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 909, 951 (2009).
116. See Lanctot, Cyberspace, supra note 75, at 179.
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A CBO participating in LACI requires professional assistance in order to ac-
complish its mission-to ensure that its staffers sufficiently understand the legal
issues that the CBO's clients encounter. MCLA is a law firm that has the capacity
to provide that professional guidance. If the training and guidance provided by
MCLA to the CBO constitutes "legal services," the resulting interaction eviden-
ces all the elements of Section 14 of the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers.1 17 If what MCLA provides to the CBO is something other than legal
services, then its role could be that of a consultant, and MCLA would then argue
that it has no attomey-client relationship with the CBO, and could expressly dis-
claim any such status.1
MCLA would be prudent to treat its guidance to a CBO as legal advice to a cli-
ent, although the analysis is far from clear, and effectively untested. The prudence
stems from these considerations: First, as just noted, the CBO receives from the
law firm individualized guidance about legal issues of importance. The CBO con-
stituents rely on that legal information and guidance. Those factors serve as the
central guideposts for establishing an attomey-client relationship.119 Indeed, if a
nonlawyer, or a company owned by a nonlawyer, offered to sell such legal guid-
ance to a CBO, the odds are that bar regulators would prohibit the transaction.120
Second, the Model Rules presume that the services provided by an attorney to a
client involve representation.12 1 And finally, some authority holds that a lawyer
performing services that a nonlawyer may also engage in may nevertheless be
bound by the ethical rules.122
But, those observations notwithstanding, it is not entirely clear that the services
offered by MCLA to a CBO qualify as legal services. MCLA offers education to
a CBO about legal issues that its employees and volunteers will encounter. No
one would claim that a law professor teaching a group of nonlawyers (her law stu-
dents) about the law in order to permit the students to perform their jobs more
117. RESTATEMENT, supra note 57, at § 14.
118. If the relationship is likely not one of attomey-client, but the beneficiary of the lawyer's guidance
might misconstrue the nature of the relationship, a disclaimer can effectively prevent an inadvertent establish-
ment of the relationship. See Lanctot, Cyberspace, supra note 75, at 155; Paige A. Thomas, Comment, Online
Legal Advice: Ethics in the Digital Age, 4 LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 440,460-61(2014).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 73-79.
120. See generally Alexis Anderson, "Custom and Practice" Unmasked: The Legal History of
Massachusetts' Experience with the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 94 MASS. L. REv. 124 (2013) (describing
the limits on nonlawyer real estate closing firms).
121. Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of "Law Consultants," 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1397, 1410 n. 66 (2006)
(citing MODEL RULES pmbl., R. 1.2).
122. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-433 (2004) ("[A] lawyer must
comply at all times with all applicable disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility whether or
not he is acting in his professional capacity." (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal
Op. 335 (1974))); In re Dwight, 573 P.2d 481, 484 (Ariz. 1977) (holding that an attorney acting in his capacity
as an investment advisor was subject to ethical rules governing attorneys) ("As long as a lawyer is engaged in
the practice of law, he is bound by the ethical requirements of that profession, and he may not defend his actions
by contending that he was engaged in some other kind of professional activity.").
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effectively is practicing law. 123 Similarly, ethics opinions and commentary con-
sistently conclude that a lawyer offering a community seminar about a legal topic
does not establish an attorney-client relationship with the attendees, and is not
practicing law while doing so. 1 2 4
The analogy to compliance counseling lends support to this analysis.
Consulting firms offering compliance services to corporations treat that product
as something other than the provision of legal services to a client, 125 in order to
justify nonlawyer participation in the activity as well as nonlawyer ownership of
firms that provide the service. 1 26 While some observers find the arguments not
persuasive,127 no authority has challenged the compliance consulting industry for
unauthorized practice, 128 and nonlawyer consultants engage in compliance work
regularly. 129 Even law firms, which are presumed to offer to their customers a
product that qualifies as legal services, may expressly disclaim an attorney-client
relationship when providing compliance consulting, relying on Model Rule 5.7,
which authorizes law firms to offer "law-related" services to customers without
incurring the duties owed to clients.130
There is some risk, though, for a law firm like MCLA to treat its work for the
CBO as a form of compliance consulting rather than as advice to a client. The
compliance counseling industry offers to its corporate customers a blend of busi-
ness, management, and regulatory (i.e., legal) expertise.13 1 That admixture of
inputs serves to support the consultant's claims that he is providing something
different from a lawyer offering focused advice about a legal matter. The LACI
training, by contrast, is entirely legal-the staffers need to know the substantive
123. See Lori K. Miller, The Non-Lawyer Educator Teaching Legal Issues in Higher Education: Legally
and Educationally Defensible?, 12 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 205, 206 (2002).
124. See Lanctot, Cyberspace, supra note 75, at 232-35 (reviewing authorities). Interestingly, for present
purposes, none of the authorities discussing the practice-of-law implications of legal seminars addresses the
question of whether the lawyer might have an attomey-client relationship with the CBO that arranges for the
presentation.
125. See Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and Innovation in the U.S. Legal Services Market, 9
N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 1, 35 (2012); Michele DeStefano, Compliance and Claim Funding: Testing the Borders of
Lawyers' Monopoly and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 2961 (2014); Dana A.
Remus, Out of Practice: The Twenty-First Century Legal Profession, 63 DUKE L.J. 1243, 1269-70 (2014);
Rostain, supra note 121, at 1398-99.
126. DeStefano, supra note 125, at 2989-90; Rostain, supra note 121, at 1409.
127. See Rostain, supra note 121, at 1407 (noting that the activity of compliance consulting often includes
all of the elements of providing tailored legal advice to a client).
128. As Tanina Rostain observes, the only exception is a 1997 investigation by Texas authorities into the
tax consulting services offered by Arthur Anderson and Deloitte & Touche. See id. at 1407 n.53. The complaint
against the firms was dismissed. As Rostain notes, tax compliance is a particularly delicate one for unauthorized
practice challenges, both because of the cross-profession jurisdiction traditions and the federalism implications.
Id. See also infra note 166 and accompanying text.
129. Id.; Remus, supra note 125, at 1271.
130. See MODEL RULES R. 5.7; Bos. Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 1999-B: Law-Related Services (1999) (describing
the implementation of Rule 5.7). For a description of that strategy, see DeStefano, supra note 125, at 2993;
Remus, supra note 125, at 1261; Rostain, supra note 121, at 1410-11.
131. See DeStefano, supra note 125.
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law and the civil and criminal procedures relevant to the problems their constitu-
ents face. The prediction here is that, if a CBO were to claim client status with its
resulting duties, the arrangement would be seen as a provision of legal services,
not law-related services.
While it would be a burden for MCLA to treat all beneficiaries who receive
guidance from the CBO staffers as clients, it is less of a complication for LACI to
treat each CBO as a client. Like with all organizational representation, the client
of MCLA would be the CBO itself, and not its staff members, absent some special
arrangement. 13 2 Given the nature of the legal services provided to a CBO, the
MCLA lawyers would be unlikely to learn sensitive, confidential information
from the organization about its internal operations. The duty of competence, as
noted above,133 is one that MCLA would unquestionably assume as part of the
LACI project. The MCLA lawyers will accept their responsibility to train and
advise the CBO staffers capably, understanding that liability ought to follow if the
lawyers breach that duty and provide less-than-competent advice to the staffers.
Nevertheless, the more confounding duty that the CBO representation entails
is that of loyalty. MCLA, as counsel to the CBO, must not engage in representa-
tion that triggers a conflict of interest with the CBO.13 4 There are settings where
that obligation will be constraining for MCLA. Imagine, for instance, a homeless
day shelter participating in LACI, with MCLA lawyers training its social workers
and housing specialists about how to guide its guests about the legal issues they
confront. The day shelter under LACI becomes a client of MCLA, and is entered
into its database for purposes of conflict checking. If an individual prospective
client (unrelated to the LACI program) were to seek the help of MCLA for a mat-
ter in which that day shelter is a possible defendant, or in some other way an
adverse party,135 MCLA would have to reject the prospective client unless the
CBO agrees to allow the representation (and the prospective client agrees as
well). It is a fundamental reality of conflicts law that a lawyer may not oppose a
current client even on an entirely unrelated matter, absent the informed consent
of the existing client for sure, and most likely the prospective client as well. 136 If
the prospective client's claim relates substantially to the work that MCLA has
been doing with and for the CBO, MCLA will no doubt simply refer that
132. See MODEL RuLES R. 1.13(a), (g).
133. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
134. See MODEL RULES R. 1.7, 1.9.
135. It is not uncommon for homeless shelter guests to have disagreements with the shelter's staff about per-
ceived mistreatment or exclusion. See, e.g., Lisa R. Green, Homeless and Battered: Women Abandoned by a
Feminist Institution, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 169, 171-73 (1991) (discussing the rules of shelters that have the
effect of excluding certain guests).
136. MODEL RULES R. 1.7(a)(1), (b). The current client's consent is not necessarily sufficient. The lawyer
must also be certain that she "will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to" both clients. Id.
If the matters are unrelated (the only time that the consent would be sought), the current client has little concern.
The prospective client, on the other hand, may worry that MCLA's ongoing relationship with the CBO will
limit the firm's zeal on her behalf.
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prospective client elsewhere. But if the new matter is unrelated, which is most
likely given the work MCLA does for the CBO, the prospect of informed consent
remains quite viable.
In light of this concern, the LACI project might operate with MCLA seeking
from each separate CBO an advance waiver of conflicts of interest involving unre-
lated matters and not implicating the CBO's confidential information. The
advance waiver device is common within large law firm operations, given the
interlocking representational commitments that national or international firm prac-
tices inevitably generate.137 Implemented with care, it is ethically proper.138 The
CBO would agree, as a condition of participating in LACI, that it will not object to
MCLA representing a later client with a dispute with the CBO in certain defined
circumstances. The waiver of the conflict would only apply to matters unrelated to
the LACI work MCLA performs for the CBO, and only if the new representation
does not risk any of the CBO's confidential information. With an advance waiver
in place, MCLA's ongoing work should not be hampered very much, if at all, by
the ongoing representation of the community-based organizations that low-income
persons interact with on a regular basis.
Here, then, is a summary of the analysis of the attomey-client relationship ques-
tion: The LACI project allows lawyers from MCLA to provide legal training and
ongoing advising to CBO staffers, who will then assist their constituents/clients to
recognize and respond to the legal problems that low-income families so often en-
counter. The work by the MCLA lawyers does not create any attomey-client com-
mitments to the beneficiary constituent/clients, nor any fiduciary duties arising from
an agency status. The arrangement would most likely create an explicit attorney-
client relationship between MCLA and each participating CBO (but not with any indi-
vidual staffer), and MCLA will need to manage its client work with that in mind.
If these conclusions are sound, and it is proper in light of those considerations
for LACI to proceed, the obvious next question is whether the LACI project runs
afoul of the prevailing understandings about unauthorized practice of law.
B. THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW QUESTION
The issue of unauthorized practice of law (UPL) is much-discussedl 39 and pro-
foundly unsatisfying. 140 The UPL doctrine does, however, possess enough
137. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 57, at § 122 (permitting advance waivers in settings where client
protection and understanding are assured); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-436
(2005) (same; withdrawing differing Op. 93-372); Richard W. Painter, Advance Waiver of Conflicts, 13 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 289 (2000).
138. Formal Op. 05-436, supra note 137.
139. A Westlaw search in its Law Review and Journals database turns up more than 4,700 articles contain-
ing the term "unauthorized practice of law." Of those, 168 include that phrase in the Article's title. More than
3,300 additional articles with that term appear in Westlaw's "Texts and Treatises" database, of which more
than 240 include the term in its title. Westlaw search, July 18, 2017.
140. See, e.g., Cotton, supra note 52, at 214 (UPL as a "quagmire" and "unsettled"); Lauren Moxley, Note,
Zooming Past the Monopoly: A Consumer Rights Approach to Reforming the Lawyer's Monopoly and
2018] 403
404 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 31:377
substance for us to examine whether the LACI project could pass muster, either
as imagined in its robust form or in some more limited fashion. 14 1
1. WHAT QUALIFIES AS UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
To assess the UPL implications of LACI, we must approach the question in
two steps. First, we must understand what qualifies as "the practice of law."
Second, we must explore when, if ever, someone without a bar license may par-
ticipate in activities that fit that definition.
Discerning the substance of "the practice of law" is remarkably challenging. 142
Some early attempts to define the practice of law demonstrate frustrating circular-
ity, including the ABA's position that "[f]unctionally, the practice of law relates
to the rendition of services for others that call for the professional judgment of a
lawyer." 143 Slightly better are more recent formulations that connect the advice
or advocacy to particularized legal questions faced by a specific person or en-
tity. 144 As one court has described the inquiry, "To determine whether an individ-
ual has engaged in the practice of law, the focus of the inquiry should be on
whether the activity in question required legal knowledge and skill in order to
apply legal principles to precedent." 145 Professor Catherine Lanctot calls this "the
hallmark of the practice of law." 146 It is apparently settled today (but was not
Improving Access to Justice, 9 HARV. L. & POL'y REV. 553, 563 (2015) (discussing the lack of clarity in UPL
doctrine due to vague definitions of what constitutes the "practice of law").
141. Programs offering services through nonlawyer providers have explored this concern. See, e.g., Robert
T. Begg, The Reference Librarian and the Pro Se Patron, 69 L. LIBR. J. 26, 31 (1976) (law librarians); Cotton,
supra note 52, at 197-98 (social worker assistance); Paul D. Healey, In Search of the Delicate Balance: Legal
and Ethical Questions in Assisting the Pro Se Patron, 90 L. LIBR. J. 129, 129-30 (1998) (law librarians);
Jonathan A. Beyer, Practicing Law at the Margins: Surveying Ethics Rules for Legal Assistants and Lawyers
Who Mediate, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 415 (1998) (mediators); Bethany Spielman, Has Faith in Health
Care Ethics Consultants Gone Too Far? Risks of an Unregulated Practice and a Model Act to Contain Them,
85 MARQ. L. REV. 161, 198-217 (2001) (ethics committees).
142. For an earlier review of the question, see ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CLIENT PROTECTION, 1994 SURVEY ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW NONLAWYER PRACTICE (1996)
(surveying definitions of "practice of law" in fifty states). See also Linda Galler, Problems in Defining and
Controlling the Unauthorized Practice ofLaw, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 773 (2002).
143. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 3-5 (1969). See also Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v.
Edwins, 540 So.2d 294, 299 (La.1989) ("Functionally, the practice of law relates to the rendition of services for
others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer."). As Deborah Rhode has observed, "it is also possi-
ble to define death as that which is the subject of services by morticians." Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the
Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34
STAN. L. REV. 1, 45-46 (1981) [hereinafter Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly].
144. For example, Oregon defines the practice of law as "the exercise of professional judgment in applying
legal principles to address another person's individualized needs through analysis, advice, or other [legal] assis-
tance." Oregon State Bar v. Smith, 942 P.2d 793, 800 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
145. Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Hallmon, 681 A.2d 510, 514 (Md. App. 1996) (quoting In
re Discipio, 645 N.E.2d 906, 910 (Ill. 1994)).
146. Lanctot, Cyberspace, supra note 75, at 182.
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always so1 4 7 ) that providing legal information is acceptable, as long as that provi-
sion does not turn into legal advice.148 It is the particularized, client-centered
interaction that qualifies the conduct as practicing law, and that distinguishes
"legal information" from "legal advice." 149 Because "the boundaries between
legal information and legal advice can be hazy," 5 0 context matters a great deal.
The second step is to articulate the role of nonlawyers in the delivery of legal
advice. State law in every jurisdiction holds, as a general proposition, that only
licensed lawyers may practice law.51 Nonlawyers-used here to refer to
everyone who is not a licensed attorney in a jurisdiction, including lawyers li-
censed in a different jurisdiction, or lawyers suspended or disbarred in their
home jurisdiction-may not practice law or deliver legal advice, subject to
some well-accepted exceptions or interpretive judgments. 15 2 Nonlawyers may
engage in activities that would otherwise qualify as the practice of law while
serving as a legal assistant supervised closely by a licensed lawyer.153 The ab-
sence of the supervision and oversight by a lawyer means that the assistant has
practiced law without a license. 15 4 In the LACI setting, the level of oversight
provided by the MCLA lawyers would not satisfy that standard.1 5 5
Nonlawyers may practice law without attorney supervision in many adminis-
trative contexts. Most state1 56 and federal agencies1 57 authorize nonlawyers to
147. See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace: Online Document Preparation and the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 811, 822-29 (2002) (describing the campaign to prevent
Norman Dacey, a nonlawyer, from publishing a book for laypersons about living trusts) [hereinafter Lanctot,
Scriveners]; Dacey v. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyer's Ass'n, 290 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y 1968) (concluding that the author
possessed First Amendment rights to publish his book).
148. See ABA SECTION OF LITIG., HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE: A REPORT OF THE
MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE 4 n.5 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/taskforces/modest/
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TZ8-GT2V]; Lanctot, Cyberspace, supra note 75, at 177-78 (exploring that
distinction).
149. See Lanctot, Cyberspace, supra note 75, at 177-78; Matthew Longobardi, Unauthorized Practice of
Law and Meaningful Access to the Courts: Is Law Too Important to Be Left to Lawyers?, 35 CARDOZO L. REv.
2043, 2051-52 (2014); Laurel A. Rigertas, Stratification of the Legal Profession: A Debate in Need of a Public
Forum, J. PROF. LAW. 79, 95 (2012).
150. Amy G. Applegate & Connie J.A. Beck, Self-Represented Parties in Mediation: Fifty Years Later It
Remains the Elephant in the Room, 51 FAM. CT. REv. 87, 98 (2013).
151. Longobardi, supra note 149.
152. Paul R. Tremblay, Shadow Lawyering: Nonlawyer Practice Within Law Firms, 85 IND. L.J. 653 (2010).
153. Id.
154. The attorney who failed to supervise the nonlawyer employee adequately will have assisted the unau-
thorized practice of law and be subject to discipline under Model Rule 5.5(a). See, e.g., Matter of Hrones, 933
N.E.2d 622 (Mass. 2010) (suspension for failure to supervise paralegal); In re McMillian, 596 S.E.2d 494 (S.C.
2004) (lawyer who allowed nonlawyer employees to perform nearly all aspects of real estate closings without
supervision violated Rule 5.5 counterpart and was disbarred); In re Sledge, 859 So.2d 671 (La. 2003) (attor-
ney's failure to supervise nonlawyer assistants warranted disbarment).
155. Tremblay, supra note 152, at 668-69.
156. See Zachary C. Zurek, Comment, The Limited Power of the Bar to Protect Its Monopoly, 3 ST.
MARY'S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 242,262-63 (2013) (reviewing state administrative exceptions to UPL).
157. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1966) ("A person compelled to appear in person before an agency or representa-
tive thereof is entitled to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel or, if permitted by the agency,
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accompany and assist litigants appearing in adjudicative proceedings before the
agencies. Those same nonlawyers may, consequently, advise the litigants about
the proceedings and their rights-activity otherwise deemed to be unauthorized
practice.5 8 This permission is not universal, though-some federal and state
agencies continue to prohibit representation by nonlawyers, relying on the same
UPL rationales relied upon by state regulators for court-based practice. For exam-
ple, Delaware has barred nonlawyer experts from appearing and advocating for
parents in federally-mandated special education appeal hearings.15 9 Other state
and federal agencies limit practice by nonlawyers.160
This gloss on the UPL doctrine has important implications for LACI and
MCLA's participation in that project. When the CBO staffers discuss the admin-
istrative matters that low-income and vulnerable persons commonly encounter,
especially Social Security and SSI disability claims, TANF and food stamp prob-
lems, public housing eligibility disputes, and unemployment insurance eligibility,
they do not engage in the unauthorized practice of law in most, if not all, states.161
Therefore, MCLA's assistance to the staffers, both generally and in specific
instances, would not contravene the ethical duties of its lawyers. As discussed in
the next subsection, that reality is helpful, but not necessarily sufficient for a ro-
bust and effective surrogate lawyering project, given the swath of matters that
remain off-limits to nonlawyer practice.162
One further nuance within the UPL doctrine has important relevance to the
LACI project and its viability. Courts and bar opinions have concluded that a
nonlawyer may engage in activities that otherwise qualify as the practice of law if
those activities are inherent in or incidental to the nonlawyer's professional role
by other qualified representative."). Many federal agencies permit that practice. See, e.g., Drew A. Swank,
Non-Attorney Social Security Disability Representatives and the Unauthorized Practice ofLaw, S. ILL. U. L.J.
223, 235 (2012) (canvassing the federal agencies that permit non-attomey practice).
158. While not directly relevant to the LACI project, it warrants mention that federal supremacy considera-
tions limit the ability of states to prohibit nonlawyers' practices, like tax advice and representation, that satisfy
all of the elements of a state's definition of the practice of law, if a federal law authorizes such practices. See
Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (patent law practice); Charles H. Kuck & Olesia Gorinshteyn,
Unauthorized Practice ofImmigration Law in the Context ofSupreme Court's Decision in Sperry v. Florida, 35
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 340,347 (2008).
159. In re Arons, 756 A.2d 867 (Del. 2000), cert. denied 532 U.S. 1065 (2001). See David C. Vladeck,
Hard Choices: Thoughts for New Lawyers, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 351 (2001) (reviewing that decision).
160. See Barbara Allison Clayton, Comment, Are We Our Brother's Keepers? A Discussion of Nonlawyer
Representation Before Texas Administrative Agencies and Recommendations for the Future, 8 TEX. TECH
ADMIN. L.J. 115, 120 (2007) (reviewing agency practices).
161. Discussion of and assistance with the Social Security and SSI matters are permitted as a matter of fed-
eral law, so would be acceptable in every jurisdiction. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1705(b) (2015) (allowing a claimant
to "appoint any person who is not an attorney to be [his or her] representative in dealings" with the Social
Security Administration); Drew A. Swank, supra note 157, at 224 (stating that it is not UPL for nonlawyers to
represent claimants in matters before the Social Security Administration). The other matters listed in the text,
to the extent they implicate state administrative law, might not be permitted, although anecdotally those prac-
tices appear to be widely acceptable.
162. See infra notes 176-87 and accompanying text.
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and accompanying responsibilities. Comment [3] to Rule 5.5 acknowledges this
UPL exception: "A lawyer may provide professional advice and instruction to
nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of the law; for example,
claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial institutions, social work-
ers, accountants and persons employed in government agencies. "163
This comment implies a reality that is well-accepted (if fairly ignored1 64 ): that
many other professions use, interpret, and apply the law as an inherent feature of
their role responsibilities. Those nonlawyers may serve their customers while
informed by legal principles, and lawyers may assist them in doing so. One ob-
server notes that the exemption applies to a practice "that is common in the com-
munity, ancillary to another established business, or restricted to 'routine'
tasks." 1 6 5
For example, a tax accountant must apply state and federal tax law in her prac-
tice, and a lawyer may properly assist an accountant in performing that role. 16 6
Real estate brokers, who need not be (and usually are not) attorneys, must under-
stand and apply legal principles to specific circumstances in their professional
roles, but within (often highly disputed) limits, they may perform their jobs. 16 7
The Comment to Rule 5.5 also includes social workers, implicitly recognizing
that many community-based social workers must understand how legal systems
and government agencies function to effectively advise and advocate for their
clients.168
If LACI represented an example of a law firm assisting nonlawyers to perform
their existing responsibilities more capably by learning more about the legal proc-
esses that their constituents/clients face, then Comment [3] to Rule 5.5 would
offer a welcome argument against any finding that the lawyers were assisting in
UPL. That argument fits the LACI model imperfectly, however. It is true that the
lawyers at MCLA may lawfully train social workers to understand regulatory
163. MODEL RULES R. 5.5 cmt. 3.
164. Only three law review articles reference Comment [3] to Rule 5.5. Westlaw search, July 24, 2017.
165. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly, supra note 143, at 82 n.326.
166. Accountant practice also represents an explicit carve-out for nonlawyer practice that is grounded in a
discrete federalism basis, given the federal tax provisions' authorization of practice by accountants and others.
See Charles Wolfram, Ethics and the Multijurisdictional Practice of Law: Sneaking Around in the Legal
Profession: Interjurisdictional Unauthorized Practice by the Transactional Lawyer, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 665,
675-76 (1995).
167. See, e.g., Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Mass., Inc. v. Nat'l Real Estate Info. Servs., 946 N.E.2d 665 (Mass.
2011); Anderson, supra note 120 (reviewing that litigation).
168. See, e.g., Toby Golick & Janet Lessem, A Law and Social Work Clinical Program for the Elderly and
Disabled: Past and Future Challenges, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 183, 187 n.12 (2004) ("recognizing the need
for social workers to receive legal training to understand and deal with their clients' problems"); Robert F.
Seibel et al., An Integrated Training Programfor Law and Counseling, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 208 (1985) (describ-
ing integrated training for law students and counseling students); Gale Humphrey Carpenter, Overriding the
Psychologist-Client Privilege in Child Custody Disputes: Are Anyone's Best Interests Being Served?, 68
UMKC L. REv. 169, 178 (1999) ("Psychologists and social workers need specialized legal training as well. It is
important that they understand the basic law regarding child custody, privileged communication, and rules of
evidence in addition to the applicable psychosocial knowledge.").
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systems, court processes, privileges, and the like in order to ensure that the social
workers advise and support their clients most effectively.169 As of yet, no author-
ity has interpreted Comment [3] to authorize social workers, and others similarly
situated, to communicate individualized, law-based instruction to those clients in
need. 17 0 A LACI-type initiative in Baltimore, one that utilized only licensed
social workers and aimed to limit their involvement to areas that avoided UPL
worries, failed after objections by the local bar and the state attorney general that
the project nevertheless constituted UPL. 17 1
The Baltimore experience aside, little precedent exists to help discern the lim-
its of this exception. The surrogacy theme of LACI imagines a broad collection
of CBO staffers, some of whom will have professional training (social workers,
reference librarians, gerontologists, nurse practitioners, nurses, doctors),172 but
many who would not (intake workers, housing specialists). Arguments grounded
in Comment [3]'s inherent or necessary aspect of a nonlawyer's employment
offers some support for the LACI initiative, especially when considered in the
context of the professional staffers, whose success in achieving their role-driven
goals may be enhanced by their clients' meaningful response to legal issues that
arise in their lives. Those arguments seemingly have less force when applied to
non-professional staffers. 17 3
Therefore, a muscular LACI program, using a wide array of CBO staffers to
provide discrete, client-directed advice on the legal issues commonly encoun-
tered by their constituents, including court-based matters, would be vulnerable to
a UPL challenge. It is plausible that such a challenge would not arise, given the
pro bono nature of the LACI project1 74 and the well-recognized understanding
that almost all UPL challenges are market- and competition-driven. 175 But an
169. See generally Anthony Bertelli, Should Social Workers Engage in the Unauthorized Practice ofLaw?,
8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 15 (1998) (social workers serving at settlement houses and community centers); Margaret
F. Brown, Domestic Violence Advocates' Exposure to Liability for Engaging in the Unauthorized Practice of
Law, 34 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 279 (2001).
170. An Alabama ethics opinion indicates that in some settings social workers may provide more tailored
services: "[T]he State of Alabama ha[s] held that a nonlawyer social worker who interviewed noncustodial
parents, arranged agreements, and prepared forms and case summaries was not engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law." Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 90-10 (1990) (citing
Alabama St. Bar Op. 87-142 (1987)); see also Jessica Dixon Weaver, Overstepping Ethical Boundaries?
Limitations on State Efforts to Provide Access to Justice in Family Courts, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 2705, 2741
(2014) (discussing both opinions).
171. See Cotton, supra note 52, at 205-20 (describing the Attorney General's response to the LEST
project).
172. See Tom Lininger, Deregulating Public Interest Law, 88 TuL. L. REv. 727, 752 (2014) (recommending
that professionals, because of their special training, be permitted to assist with low-income advising).
173. No reported attorney discipline case, nor UPL enforcement action, has applied the Comment [3] excep-
tion to the limitations on nonlawyer activity, so the best one can do is to speculate about its breadth and
application.
174. But see Cotton, supra note 52, at 195-96 (describing the immediate challenge to the Baltimore LEST
program, an expressly access-to-justice initiative that did not charge clients).
175. See McMorrow, supra note 4, at 697; DeStefano, supra note 125, at 2979.
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innovation such as LACI cannot proceed on the assumption that it would remain
under the radar of the bar discipline authorities or the UPL enforcement agency.
That conclusion suggests two complementary responses. First, we should con-
sider whether (and if so, how) a streamlined, limited, cabined LACI might oper-
ate. Second, we ought to examine what the implications would be if the legal
profession and state regulatory actors permitted the most robust LACI project to
proceed. What would be the risks, and are they manageable?
2. SURROGACY WITHIN UPL BOUNDS
If the architects of LACI proceeded with a risk-averse stance regarding the
UPL limitations, they might include three separable components to the surrogacy
delivery system. LACI-light, if we might refer to it as such, could include struc-
tures to allow or ensure: (1) full, active discussion with, and guidance to, clients
on those areas in which nonlawyers may practice, which in most states include
most administrative law settings; (2) only generic, non-individualized handouts
and referrals to other resources (including technology and, of course, lawyers) on
those areas that qualify as the practice of law, which include just about all court-
based proceedings; and (3) screening by CBO staffers for available subsidized
and pro bono lawyers to make their intake and triage systems more efficient.
These components would together offer a useful, if constrained, service to con-
stituents in need. Let us consider each component briefly.
Active Guidance on Permitted Topics: As noted above, all states permit non-
lawyers to perform activities that would otherwise constitute the practice of law,
including advocating at hearings in select settings, almost always administrative
in nature.17 6 The most apt examples would be claims under the Social Security
Act for benefits. 7 and public welfare matters.1s Because nonlawyers may appear
as representatives at hearings, they may also advise claimants outside of the
hearing settings. Not all administrative areas are included in this dispensation,
however.17 9 To the extent that the surrogacy project limits the CBO staffers' as-
sistance to those areas of law and regulation that are certain to permit nonlawyers
to participate, the risk of UPL enforcement would be minimal.
This qualification serves as a significant limitation on the LACI idea, however.
For one, because nonlawyers have traditionally been permitted to advise constitu-
ents about the areas covered by this suggestion, this surrogacy project is hardly
innovative, and adds little to the ATJ mission. Relatedly, the impetus for a surro-
gacy project like LACI is the stark need for clients to have guidance on the areas
176. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
177. See Swank, supra note 157.
178. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Future Role of "Law Workers": Rethinking the Forms ofLegal Practice
and the Scope of Legal Education, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 917, 918 (2002); Marlene M. Remmert, Note,
Representation of Clients Before Administrative Agencies: Authorized or Unauthorized Practice of Law?, 15
VAL. U. L. REv. 567,577 (1981).
179. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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that this suggestion excludes, most notably housing, family, employment, and
debt collection disputes. This limitation also restricts considerably the holistic
advantages of the guidance offered by the CBO staffers.s0
Constrained Guidance on Legal Matters: The UPL restrictions arguably pro-
hibit the more ambitious elements of LACI. A CBO staffer likely cannot, given
accepted interpretation of UPL limits, discuss with a constituent how she might
respond to her eviction notice, how the courts might treat her claims in response
to the court complaint, or what tactics might improve her chances of avoiding the
loss of her housing. That staffer could not counsel a worker who has received
court papers seeking to collect a debt about his rights to protect his wages against
the attachment or garnishment processes."s' Instead, to avoid any UPL violation,
the staffers could only provide to the clients (but not explain to them) printed
materials describing tactics and substantive law,182 and refer the clients to the
most user-friendly and appropriate technology to guide the clients in a more inter-
active fashion.183
One as-yet-unanswered question arises in this setting. A nonlawyer CBO
staffer, in the risk-averse LACI environment, will not explain to a client how to
interpret a state statute or regulation as it might apply to that individual's circum-
stances. 184 The staffer may provide the statute or regulation, but may not discuss
its relevance, given current UPL restrictions. How, then, would the UPL doctrine
treat the staffer collaboratively walking the client through an interactive online
program made for low-income clients facing court-based legal issues? The better
answer to that question, both from a policy standpoint and analytically, would be
that such collaborative assistance would be entirely proper. Imagine a staffer
using his computer with a client to follow the online resource about how to
respond to eviction court papers.8 ' As long as the staffer simply reads the screen
guidance along with the client, with the two together deciding which box to
check, or how to understand what the resource means by its instructions, there is
no law being practiced by the staffer. The staffer never tells the client what the
law is or what his suggestions are for making law-related decisions; instead, the
staffer relies on the legal resources on the screen to ensure that the client under-
stands them and responds with the correct inputs.186
180. See Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People's Courts, 22 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 473, 485 (2015).
181. See Lisa Stifler, Debt in the Courts: The Scourge ofAbusive Debt Collection Litigation and Possible
Policy Solutions, 11 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 91, 107-08 (2017) (describing the prevalence of consumers
defaulting in debt-collection lawsuits).
182. See Lanctot, Scriveners, supra note 147, at 849-50.
183. See Greiner et al., supra note 8, at 1130-35 (evaluating pro se assistance devices and systems).
184. See Lanctot, Scriveners, supra note 147, at 849-50.
185. Id. at 841-49 (discussing assistance with Bankruptcy Court forms).
186. See In re Moffett, 263 B.R. 805, 815 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2001) ("This Court has no problem with [the
non-lawyer] using a computer program, but she is only permitted to receive information from potential debtors
on official bankruptcy forms.").
410
SURROGATE LAWYERING
If that assessment is sound, this service could be useful to many clients, and
especially those who do not have access to the needed technology that the online
services require, or the ability to process online information without assistance.187
Screening and Triage Opportunities: A limited LACI project would likely use
the resources of the CBO staffers to aid existing legal service providers to refine
their intake choices, by screening potential clients and making tailored referrals.
Some existing access-to-justice projects have implemented this component. 88
No authority has claimed that the process of screening and providing referrals to
legal service providers qualifies as the practice of law, and observers have recog-
nized this as a proper role for nonlawyers.189 But the limitations of this service
are readily apparent. The existing subsidized legal services delivery mechanism
is already overwhelmed with clients, so the chances of the CBO staffers' constitu-
ents getting access to bespoke legal services are slim.190 That is, indeed, the ra-
tionale for exploration of surrogacy projects like the robust version of LACI.19 1
There is considerable benefit, though, in this aspect of a lawful LACI, even if it
fails to achieve the goals of the surrogacy mission. Because the CBO staffers see
constituents/clients on a regular basis and often know the context of their family,
housing, employment, financial, and health conditions better than any intake
worker or screener at a legal aid organization can discern from that setting, legal
issues might be recognized sooner, and those with the most need for tailored,
direct legal assistance could get it. The efficiency and reliability of the triage sys-
tem operating at the legal aid agency could be improved considerably through
this interaction. That, in combination with the staffers' connecting constituents to
technology resources in ways that could be most useful to them at the time that
they need such guidance, could make some difference advancing access to legal
help.
IV. IMAGINING A MORE ROBUST SURROGACY PROTOCOL
This Article will now imagine a regime where a more robust LACI arrange-
ment would be acceptable. This Article examines the risks, benefits, and
187. See JOHN M. GREACEN, RESOURCES TO ASSIST SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS: A FIFTY-STATE
REVIEW OF THE "STATE OF THE ART" (2011), available at https://www.srln.org/system/files/attachments/
Greacen50StateReviewReportNationalEdition20l 1.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD4H-Y44R].
188. See, e.g., Bertelli, supra note 169, at 22 (describing the Women's Re-Entry Resource Network
(WRRN) in Cleveland).
189. See, e.g., Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation: Rethinking the
Professional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 235, 290 (2002)
(noting the benefit of nonlawyer mediators making informed referrals to lawyers).
190. See Latonia Haney Keith, Poverty, The Great Unequalizer: Improving the Delivery System for Civil
Legal Aid, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 55, 96 (2016) ("[Tlhe system is currently drinking from a fire hose.").
191. That reality serves to undermine the mission of the programs described by Anthony Bertelli. See
Bertelli, supra note 169. The justification for the reentry program was ultimately to make referrals to legal aid
and pro bono lawyers. Id. at 22. But the very need for the program was the absence of available lawyers to serve
those in need.
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safeguards that such an arrangement would entail, and concludes that a more just
system would permit a surrogacy project that used existing CBO resources more
directly, while acknowledging that the benefits of that project impose some costs
that its users would need to accept. It first explores the risks of a robust LACI,
and then sketches out some systemic safeguards that might minimize, though not
eliminate, those risks.
A. ASSESSMENT OF RISKS
A robust surrogacy project will use nonlawyer CBO staffers to advise clients
on critical, if basic, legal rights, duties, deadlines, and tactics that the clients need
to appreciate in order to avoid suffering losses within the legal system. 19 2 If UPL
bars the CBO staffers from providing that service, it would be because of a worry
that the staffers, not having graduated law school or passed the bar examination,
do not have the training, expertise, or judgment to provide useful, reliable guid-
ance.193 In addition to competence concerns, nonlawyers do not assure the clients
the same ethical commitments that lawyers provide, 19 4 and no licensing agency
oversees nonlawyers making such commitments.195 The risks to the constituents/
clients, then, are readily stated-they might very well receive bad advice, lose
rights, and risk unfaithful assistance. Purely for purposes of this analysis, let us
accept these components as understandable.19 6
Equally obvious, though, and almost as well-rehearsed, is the rejoinder that the
UPL justifications implicitly compare the predicament of a client aided by a non-
lawyer with a client aided by a lawyer. 197 In that comparative setting, it is
straightforward (if sometimes misleading 9 8 ) to conclude that the client would be
much better with a lawyer providing assistance instead of a less-trained, less-
monitored nonlawyer. But that comparison is inapt-even cruelly inapt. The
more candid assessment would be to compare the benefits to a low- or moderate-
income client of assistance from a nonlawyer CBO staffer versus no assistance at
all, and operating within the legal system on his own. With that comparison, as
many have pointed out, the answer is just as obvious as with the first, inapt com-
parison. There is little doubt that having some reasonably informed and educated
192. See Cantrell, supra note 36.
193. This is an obvious and well-established rationale for UPL protections. See, e.g., CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 15.1.2, at 828-32 (1986). See also George J. Annas, Ethics Committees:
From Ethics Comfort to Ethical Cover, 21 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 18, 21 ("[Elncouraging a group of lay people to
attempt to practice law makes no more sense than encouraging a group of lawyers to attempt to perform
surgery.").
194. See Denckla, supra note 2, at 2593 (summarizing the argument).
195. See Longobardi, supra note 149, at 2049.
196. Each of the risks identified in the text is subject to considerable uncertainty. For one source that can-
vasses the competing arguments, see WOLFRAM, supra note 193, §15.1.2, at 828-34.
197. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 22.
198. See infra text accompanying notes 200-02.
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guidance from an experienced participant in the systems that matter to the client
is better overall than no guidance at all.199
The point might be asserted even more strongly. Given the nature of the "sharp
legal things" 200 into which low- and moderate-income clients so often bump, and
the lived experiences of the clients and their struggles, it is a fair question to ask
whether social workers and CBO staffers might be better qualified than lawyers
to offer guidance,20 1 or at least the kind of guidance needed for the preliminary,
out-of-court, responsive tactics that the surrogacy project contemplates. Recall
that the LACI project would not involve CBO staffers appearing in court, or
drafting pleadings other than through available forms or templates,202 tasks for
which lawyers are, at least arguably, better suited in light of their professional
training. But a CBO staffer who is familiar with the typical procedures faced day
after day, crisis after crisis, by her constituents, could end up knowing better than
some pro bono lawyers from private law firms how to navigate the systems that
the clients must survive.203
While the staffers would not appear in court or draft free-style pleadings, they
would strategize with clients, suggest actions that would have real, and at times
irrevocable, consequences, 20 4 and aid them to understand the relevant deadlines.
If the array of options available to a client enmeshed in a court proceeding were
(a) representation by a lawyer; (b) assistance from a CBO staffer with limited
access to a lawyer and full access to online assistance; or (c) handling everything
on his own, the first choice is likely the most preferred, but if the first option is
not available, the second option will often be preferable to the third. If the UPL
199. See Cantrell, supra note 36, at 885-90; Benjamin P. Cooper, Access to Justice Without Lawyers, 47
AKRON L. REV. 205, 207 (2014).
200. Wexler, supra note 13, at 1050.
201. Commentators have argued that nonlawyers are as capable as lawyers in some settings. See Cantrell,
supra note 36, at 885 (reporting on some limited empirical studies showing nonlawyers as capable as lawyers
for certain purposes); Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their
Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115,
1146-49 (2000) (noting and critiquing the argument that nonlawyers are less qualified than lawyers, but
acknowledging some settings where it holds true); cf. Bruce A. Green, Lawyers as Nonlawyers in Child-
Custody and Visitation Cases: Questions from the "Legal Ethics" Perspective, 73 IND. L.J. 665,671-72 (1998)
(arguing that in the role of guardian ad litem "[s]ocial workers and trained lay people may be better qualified"
than lawyers).
202. The surrogacy project could, however, include the CBO staffer assisting a client to complete a court
form with which the staffer is familiar, including on-line forms. See supra text accompanying notes 122-86.
Some court protocols permit laypersons to assist litigants with court forms, such as in domestic violence protec-
tion proceedings. See, e.g., 80 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 138, 139 (1995).
203. Cantrell, supra note 36, at 886-87 (summarizing the findings in HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL
ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK (1998)).
204. For instance, an intake worker at a housing resource agency might assist a public housing tenant to
complete a form answer to an eviction complaint, using an online resource developed for that purpose. The
defenses raised in that answer, and any that the tenant-defendant did not raise, would determine the issues that
the housing court judge or jury could consider. See, e.g., E. GEORGE DAHER ET AL., 33A MAss. PRAC.,
LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW § 16:3 (3d ed. 2017) (tenant defenses waived if not raised in responsive
pleading).
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restrictions have as their goal to protect the interests of those clients, in a benevo-
lent paternalistic fashion,20 5 it is safe to assume that those clients would freely
choose to take the risks that accompany the assistance by the CBO staffers.
B. SAFEGUARDS
Let us continue this thought experiment by accepting for present purposes that
a surrogacy program like the robust LACI described at the beginning of this
Article makes sense as an access-to-justice initiative. Under existing law the initi-
ative possibly falters on UPL grounds, but let us explore ways in which the pre-
vailing UPL enforcement strategies might be adjusted to accommodate such an
initiative. This exercise calls for nuance.
Two blunt suggestions warrant only brief consideration. First, the surrogacy
proposal need not, on its own, require a wholesale jettisoning of the UPL machin-
ery. Some observers advocate for full access to counseling and advising of clients
by nonlawyers, regardless of context,2 06 but that stance is not common.
Accommodation of surrogacy will more likely call for some more subtle tweak-
ing of the existing restrictions rather than a wholesale abandonment of them.
The second proposal that ordinarily would have considerable currency in a
context such as this, but in fact has none here, is the familiar idea of licensing
nonlawyers to perform specified duties, having been tested and monitored in a
fashion similar to that applicable to lawyers.20 7 Some states have developed such
protocols in recent years. 2 0 8 The licensing concept has substantial merit, but it
does not work for the innovation offered by surrogacy projects like LACI. The
beauty of LACI is in its organic use of staffers who work within the street-level
bureaucracies of CBOs. Those staffers have their important primary day (or
night) jobs, providing social work support, housing search help, domestic vio-
lence counseling, primary health care, and the like. Some of the CBO staffers
may wish to proceed through the steps necessary to be certified as a licensed
205. See WOLFRAM, supra note 193, at § 15.1.2, at 832 ("Nonlawyers are hardly ever consulted about the
wisdom of particular [UPL] rules.... [T]he protection [of nonlawyers by UPL rules] is probably unwanted and
thus paternalistic in a most objectionable way."); Denckla, supra note 2, at 2595.
206. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional
Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229, 1269 (1995)
("Lawyers and nonlawyers would be able to provide legal services, but only those admitted to the bar would be
able to call themselves 'lawyers."').
207. The proposal to license nonlawyers to assist in certain low-complexity, routine legal matters has been a
familiar one within the access-to-justice universe for decades. For some pioneering examples of this idea, see
Kritzer, supra note 178, at 920-21; Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly, supra note 143, at 38;
Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 701, 709-10 (1996).
208. Washington State recently introduced a "limited license legal technician" (LLLT) program. See
Become a Legal Technician, WASH. ST. B. Ass'N, (Dec. 28, 2017), http://www.wsba.org/Licensing-and-
Lawyer-Conduct/Limited-Licenses/Legal-Technicians [https://perma.cc/B4RC-VW3K]. California has had a
Legal Document Assistants program since 2000. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6400-15 (West 2017);
Longobardi, supra note 149, at 2075-76.
414
SURROGATE LAWYERING
paralegal authorized to provide certain services, but the odds are that not many of
them would, or could, given the demands on their time. If LACI were to work
effectively, it would need to be implemented using the existing staff of the CBOs,
trained and then supported by the lawyers. The surrogacy model assumes the par-
ticipation of unlicensed staffers.
The reality presents a challenge, then, to this thought experiment. How would
one limit the use of nonlawyers to certain activities or contexts, without a licens-
ing and monitoring scheme? It may be impossible, but some criteria warrant
further exploration. Consider this possibility: ATJ proponents might seek dispen-
sation from the stage regulatory agency that enforces UPL violations 209 and the
state attorney disciplinary authorities 210 for an express, structured program with
identified safeguards. The proposal might seek permission for employees and vol-
unteers of community-based service providers to advise, for no compensation,
low- and moderate-income clients about identified legal areas, as long as the pro-
gram is overseen by a local legal services or public interest organization. The
lawyers working for the oversight law firm must treat each participating CBO as
its client, triggering competence duties and malpractice liability exposure for the
firm.2 11 As long as the supervising law firm has provided competent oversight,
training, and back-up advice, the clients will have no right to hold the CBO or its
staffers liable for negligent advising.
Let us examine each of the elements of this hypothetical surrogacy ATJ initia-
tive, including the implementation challenges each promises.
Oversight and structural management by a legal services organization: In this
imagined world, UPL restrictions remain in place generally, and well-meaning
nonlawyers (as well as other nonlawyers) who advise clients on matters that qual-
ify as the practice of law risk sanctions for doing so, unless they fit within the
structured surrogacy initiative. The safe harbor/exemption from UPL enforce-
ment follows from the legal services provider (for our purposes, MCLA) entering
into a contractual arrangement with CBOs to organize the advising efforts.
Identifying CBOs: It is not obvious that the system needs to identify ex ante
what types of organizations qualify as appropriate community-based organiza-
tions eligible to participate in the surrogacy initiative. The judgment of MCLA
may suffice. As a practical matter, MCLA will only enter into a partnership with
those organizations that regularly serve low- and moderate-income clients who,
209. See Paula M. Young, A Connecticut Mediator in a Kangaroo Court?: Successfully Communicating the
"Authorized Practice of Mediation" Paradigm to "Unauthorized Practice of Law" Disciplinary Bodies, 49 S.
TEX. L. REv. 1047, 1156 (2008) (describing the array of UPL enforcement agencies).
210. Because assistance with UPL constitutes a breach of the ethical duties of a licensed lawyer, the surro-
gacy program must include a buy-in from the attorney discipline authority, to provide a safe harbor for the law-
yers involved.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 123-30 (discussing the prospect that a CBO might not necessarily
qualify as a client).
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as the CBO knows, encounter common legal issues on a regular basis.2 12
Applying any safe harbor to pro bono advice provided to low- and moderate-
income clients: A surrogacy initiative seemingly would only gamer institutional
support, and be justified in light of broadly-accepted UPL rationales, if it sup-
ported free advice to clients who cannot afford lawyers in the commercial legal
services market. The surrogate lawyering model would not include businesses
that charge for their services. This component of a surrogacy initiative is quite
self-evident, but it invites complications at the operational level. Not all CBOs
offer their services for free. Hospitals and community health centers charge their
patients, for example. The safe harbor applicable to a LACI-type program would
need to ensure that the health center does not add any further charges for guidance
offered on legal matters.213 While the LACI-type program ought to apply only to
low- and moderate-income clients, if a safe harbor were incorporated, it would be
impractical to expect income-screening as a condition of participation within the
program and the resulting exemption from UPL restrictions.
Limiting the areas of law permitted to be addressed: A sensible and workable
surrogacy arrangement would need either to identify ex ante the legal areas for
which the staffers may advise clients, or, alternatively, require that the written
agreement between MCLA and the CBO articulate the areas for which MCLA
would be responsible, and establish the bounds of advice-giving in that fashion.
The primary point is that participating in a LACI-type program should not give
the staffers permission to freely advise clients on whatever matters they happen
to encounter. There must be some relationship between the training and support
offered by MCLA and the guidance provided by the staffers. It is difficult to
imagine a surrogacy arrangement that does not include housing, family, and debt
collection, all areas traditionally deemed the practice of law2 14 and the source of
serious need for representation in most courts hearing those matters.215
Employment law is a plausible candidate as well. The possibility of bankruptcy
212. For a narrative exposition of the kinds of agencies that poor persons use, and the problems they en-
counter and share there, see KATHRYN J. EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST
NOTHING IN AMERICA 99-105 (2015).
213. Given the funding mechanisms for most health providers, with private or public insurance accounting
for nearly all the revenue of the operations, there is little worry that the CBO would add charges for advising
patients about the legal matters discussed. Indeed, because one of the legal issues addressed in CBO settings
with low-income patients is eligibility for public benefits, including Medicaid, reports show that a medical-
legal partnership program can result in increased revenues for a hospital. See Laura K. Abel & Susan Vignola,
Economic and Other Benefits Associated with the Provision of Civil Legal Aid, 9 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 139,
144-45 (2010) (reporting the data); Jon D. Levy, The World Is Round: Why We Must Assure Equal Access to
Civil Justice, 62 ME. L. REv. 561, 574-75 (2010) (discussing the studies).
214. See Anderson, supra note 120, at 138 (debt collection); Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca,
Protecting the Profession or the Public? Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2587, 2600 (2014) (housing and family law).
215. See Paris R. Baldacci, Assuring Access to Justice: The Role of the Judge in Assisting Pro Se Litigants
in Litigating Their Cases in New York City's Housing Court, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 659, 661-
69 (2006) (describing the challenges of unrepresented litigants in a crowded urban court setting).
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advice serves as a useful test of the limits of a surrogacy model, given the great
need for bankruptcy advice but the inherent, and often confounding, complexity
of that area of the law.2 16
The liability exposure: If in our imagined world a surrogacy initiative proceeded,
some clients will receive advice that is misguided-or, that appears to the client to
have been misguided because it did not work. That consequence represents an
explicit factor in the cost/benefit analysis of permitting some nonlawyer advising in
the ATJ setting. The risk exists that nonlawyers might provide guidance that is less
sophisticated than that provided by a lawyer, or that overlooks a nuance that the law-
yer would catch. But, as the calculus we reviewed concluded,217 it will often be bet-
ter, overall, for clients who cannot have access to any lawyer to have access to a
trained staffer, should they so choose. The clients will understand that the staffer is
not a lawyer, and that disclaimer may be sufficient to protect the CBO. A more am-
bitious, but also problematic, suggestion is that the clients would agree that should
the guidance not work they will have no right to present claims against the staffer or
the CBO for providing improper advice, absent intentional misconduct on the part
of the staffer or the CBO. Most, and perhaps all, jurisdictions permit knowing waiv-
ers of liability in many circumstances that include risks that the participants will-
218
ingly assume. The surrogacy initiative, much like ski slopes, kayak rentals,
sporting events, and the like,219 could not function without the clients' acknowledg-
ing and accepting the risks. 220 As with most waivers used in the business world,
claims based on intentional misconduct would survive.221
216. For an in-depth discussion of efforts to assist unrepresented bankruptcy debtors, see Lanctot,
Scriveners, supra note 147, at 841-49.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 196-202.
218. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) ("When permitted by contract law,
substantive law governing the claim, and applicable rules of construction, a contract between the plaintiff and
another person absolving the person from liability for future harm bars the plaintiff's recovery from that person
for the harm."); contra Peter M. Kinkaid & William J. Stuntz, Note, Enforcing Waivers in Products Liability,
69 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1112 (1983).
219. See, e.g., My Fair Lady of Georgia, Inc. v. Harris, 364 S.E.2d 580, 581 (Ga. App. 1987) (holding that
agreement that released fitness club "from liability for injury caused by any negligence" was valid and enforce-
able; member contractually assumed the risk of injury); Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 747 (Mass.
2002) (holding that signed release barred a claim for injuries to a high school cheerleader). For a practical dis-
cussion of the use of releases, see Steven B. Lesser, The Great Escape: How to Draft Exculpatory Clauses that
Limit or Extinguish Liability, 75 FLA. B. J. 10 (2001).
220. The logistical arrangements needed to obtain informed consent within the CBO environments are
likely somewhat daunting. Not every homeless person at a shelter or domestic violence victim will agree to
receive advice from a staffer, so the informed waiver of any liability claims would, presumably, be discussed
and negotiated only when advice is available and sought by the client. The waiver language therefore would
not be included in the typical waiver forms signed by all CBO constituents, implying that the advice provided
by the staffers would need to be separately identified and agreed-upon.
221. Releases that purport to cover intentional misconduct are often unenforceable as against public policy.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 218, at § cmt. d ("Generally, contracts absolving a party from
intentional or reckless conduct are disfavored."); Paula Duggan Vraa & Steven M. Sitek, Public Policy
Considerations for Exculpatory and Indemnification Clauses: Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., 32 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 1315, 1318 (2006).
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The clients would also have no claims against the oversight law firm, such as
MCLA, given the absence of any relationship between MCLA and the clients, as
described earlier.22 2 But MCLA would owe the same competence duties to the
CBOs as MCLA would owe to a conventional client. Those duties depend on the
nature of the legal services that MCLA has agreed to provide.223 MCLA must
therefore provide competent training materials and instruction to the staffers, and
provide capable follow-up advice to staffers when appropriate. If the client
waiver limits claims against the CBOs, the claims against MCLA would be simi-
larly scarce, since the only likely harm suffered by a CBO would result from a
colorable claim presented by a client harmed by the CBO's advice.
V. THE UPL IMPLICATIONS OF A SURROGACY INNOVATION
With the innovations just described, perhaps a LACI-type program could
work. Its safe-harbor conception for certain kinds of nonlawyer advising
presents delicate challenges for the established bar that has supported UPL
restrictions consistently over the past century. Arguments favoring LACI by
ATJ proponents would not have sufficient credibility or persuasion without
assimilating in some fashion the conventional UPL rationales. If UPL restric-
tions are grounded in the values their supporters claim, how can bar leaders
accept lawyering activity by unlicensed nonlawyers on behalf of the most vul-
nerable of client populations? 224
Critics of strict UPL limits argue that those policies recognize little more
than guild protectionism. 225 Bar leaders disagree, but their arguments are,
frankly, weaker than those of the critics. 226 The chief-and often the only-
complainants about nonlawyers encroaching upon lawyers' terrain are lawyers,
222. See supra text accompanying notes 73-97.
223. A lawyer providing "unbundled," or limited, discrete-task services to a client owes the same duty of
care to that client, but understood within the context of the limited service. See, e.g., AmBase Corp. v. Davis
Polk & Wardwell, 866 N.E.2d 1033, 1036-37 (N.Y. 2007) (holding that law firm was not liable for failure to
address an issue because of limited retainer agreement); Lemer v. Laufer, 819 A.2d 471, 482-83 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2003) (same); Michele N. Struffolino, Taking Limited Representation to the Limits: The Efficacy
of Using Unbundled Legal Services in Domestic-Relations Matters Involving Litigation, 2 ST. MARY'S J.
LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 166 (2012); Nina Ingwer Van Wormer, Note, Help at Your Fingertips: A
Twenty-First Century Response to the Pro Se Phenomenon, 60 VAND. L. REV. 983, 1005 (2007).
224. Protection of vulnerable client populations is a common justification for UPL restrictions. See RHODE,
supra note 22, at 82-83.
225. Id. at 76, 82-83; Denckla, supra note 2, at 2581.
226. See, e.g., Wilford A. Hahn, Fighting UPL-From a Penknife to a Sword, 50-AUG. RES GESTAE 14, 18
(2006) ("The primary purpose of prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law arises from the need to protect
the public from representation by individuals who are not qualified and do not have the legal training necessary
to represent others .... ). For the opposing view, see, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 193, § 15.1.2, at 832; Barlow
F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors-or Even
Good Sense?, 5 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159, 215 (1980) ("Barring actual evidence of serious injury, the profes-
sion has no justification, except perhaps for purely selfish reasons, for denying to the public the right to choose
from whom it will purchase legal services.").
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not consumers.227 The otherwise-persuasive arguments on the merits in support
of a LACI-type program create an unfortunate "optics" problem for bar leaders.
A LACI safe harbor is concededly unthreatening to the interests of the private
bar. The clients aided by LACI are not the customers of private lawyers-the
choice without LACI, recall, was between a subsidized or pro bono lawyer, or
the client proceeding pro se. There is virtually no commercial market for the
advice provided freely by the CBO staffers.228 If ATJ proponents were to succeed
in persuading bar authorities to permit a surrogacy experiment like LACI, the
cynical reaction-that UPL restrictions are truly driven by market concerns-
will be difficult to avoid.
There is yet another, related cynical response that surrogacy proponents must
anticipate. Defenders of UPL restrictions have a more-than-plausible collection
of arguments for restricting the practice of law to lawyers grounded in the
increasingly complex nature of law, the regulatory state, and civil procedure.229
The consumer-protection justification for UPL limits is central to that enterprise.
Employing arguments well-accepted within public health circles, bar leaders pro-
hibit persons with legal problems from trying untested and possibly dangerous
remedies, even if the users are willing to take those risks.230 A LACI exception
appears to waive that protection only for the poor and the vulnerable. If the under-
lying UPL-limiting arguments have merit, one needs to articulate a principled ba-
sis on which to depart from those justifications.
The most promising response would build upon insights shared by Lucie
White, who argues, "boldly," as she describes it, that "the social needs of disen-
franchised groups should be addressed sui generis, in ways that reflect their own
experiences of need, their embedded historical and cultural realities, the societal
power landscapes of their perspectives, their capacities, and their normative aspi-
rations[.]" 23 1 White critiques efforts to fit the legal representational needs of
227. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly, supra note 143, at 33-34; Rhode & Ricca, supra note
214, at 2591-92.
228. I acknowledge a developing counter-example to the assertion in the text. Among the most vibrant and
exciting ATJ developments in the past decade is the emergence of low-bono incubator projects, where recent
graduates developing new solo practices offer unbundled and otherwise below-market legal services to clients
who are not served by free legal aid and pro bono. See, e.g., Laura D. Cohen, Luz E. Herrera & William T.
Tanner, Launching the Los Angeles Incubator Consortium, 83 UMKC L. REv. 861 (2014); Herrera, supra note
10. The clients of LACI could be, in some settings, the clients of the incubator lawyers. Given the ATJ orienta-
tion of the incubator programs across the country, and given the vast number of underserved clients facing the
kinds of legal problems a LACI-type project would aim to address, the likelihood of the incubator bar resisting
a surrogacy experiment are exceedingly slim.
229. Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, The Pedagogy of Problem Solving: Applying Cognitive Science to Teaching
Legal Problem Solving, 45 CREIGHTON L. REv. 699, 740 ("[L]aw is becoming increasingly complex.").
230. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for
Organs, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1813 (2007); Austin Winniford, Note, Expanding Access to InvestigationalDrugs
for Treatment Use: A Policy Analysis and Legislative Proposal, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 205 (2009).
231. Lucie White, Specially Tailored Legal Services for Low-Income Persons in the Age of Wealth
Inequality: Pragmatism or Capitulation?, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2573, 2578 (1999) (emphasis in original).
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disadvantaged populations into the schemas applicable to those who have means,
especially as the gulf between those two groups grows wider. She notes similar
themes within progressive public health literature, challenging "a single norma-
tive vision of 'equal health care' across the wealth spectrum." 23 2 The traditional
models of addressing legal needs of low- and moderate-income persons remain
frustratingly ineffective, and the bar leadership recognizes that reality. Without
abandoning the ideals on which the UPL doctrine has grown, those leaders may
be open to innovative systems, like LACI, that recognize that (even given the
established bar's assumptions) some guidance is better than no guidance.
CONCLUSION
A legal guidance program staffed primarily by nonlawyers, with licensed coun-
sel remaining in the background in a purely supportive role, might pass ethical
muster, but the bar's firm control over the practice of law discourages such an
effort. While the ambiguity about the definition and limits of the practice of law
offer some glimmers of hope for such a program's success, a more prudent
approach would worry about the implications of unauthorized practice. The
resulting constraint on innovation in the field of access-to-justice is unfortunate.
Some protocols might be included in such a program that, while limiting the
effectiveness of the initiative, might ensure its success. A more robust surrogacy
arrangement, if approved by a forward-thinking jurisdiction, could achieve im-
portant access-to-justice goals at limited risk of societal harm, or harm to the pro-
fession. The bar leadership ought to welcome that kind of innovation, as its
benefits outweigh its costs by a considerable margin.
232. Id. at n.30 (citing WOMEN, POVERTY, AND AIDS: SEX, DRUGS, AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE (Paul
Farmer et al. eds., 1996)).
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